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INTRODUCTION 
 
May 18, 1951. Welsh radio host Wynford Vaughan-Thomas stands at the top of the Shot 
Tower at twilight, and watches the sky darken. Across the Thames lie the Houses of Parliament, 
and below him, the South Bank. A former docklands and zone of industrial development, the 
new façade of the South Bank bears little trace of its utilitarian heritage. “And I was watching the 
lights coming up in Parliament,” recalled Vaughan-Thomas, “and then, quite suddenly, the South 
Bank lit up. It was overpowering — all London has never seen anything like it for brilliance and 
intensity. My companion turned to me and said: You know there’s been nothing like this since 
the Blitz, but you can enjoy this while in comfort… It was a carnival of light.”1 Two weeks 
earlier, the Festival of Britain had begun.  
 The origins of the Festival date to 1943. Four years into the Second World War, the 
Royal Society of the Arts delivered a proposal to the coalition government that called for a 
centenary of the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition – to occur “after victory” in 1951.2 Following 
endorsement, the first wave of planning placed the celebration in Hyde Park or Battersea, where 
displays would highlight the sophistication of British manufacturing, craftsmanship, and 
industrial design. By March 1946, the appointed centenary committee had indeed pushed 
forward plans for a “Universal International Exhibition” in Hyde Park, with a new emphasis on 
postwar economic recovery.3 And yet, despite these efforts, the plans collapsed in the spring of 
                                                          
1 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, At the Festival (BBC General Overseas Service, May 18, 1951), from British 
Library Sound Archives, 1min. 30sec., B2485/1/21. 
2 See F.M. Leventhal, “A Tonic to the Nation: The Festival of Britain, 1951,” Albion 27, no. 3 (1995): 445, 
David Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources, and Experts in the Second World War 
(London: Penguin Books, 2011), and Mark Connelly, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the 
Second World War (Harlow: Pearson, 2004). Edgerton argues that an overconfidence in victory emerged 
as a result of Britain’s greater industrial strength in comparison to that of Nazi Germany. Connelly points 
to the influence of Christianity during the war, as some Britons believed that God would ultimately protect 
the island nation from a successful Nazi invasion. 
3 Known as the Ramsden Committee Report. Leventhal, “A Tonic to the Nation,” 445.  
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1947 when reconstruction costs and prolonged austerity measures discouraged parliament from 
funding a “corporate reaffirmation of faith in the nation’s future.”4 All the same, that November, 
then Leader of the House of Commons Herbert Morrison implored parliament to reassess its 
decision. The Festival was an invaluable opportunity for a “nation-wide adventure”5 to 
encourage “pride in our past and all that it has meant; confidence in the future which holds so 
many opportunities for us to continue our contribution to the well-being of mankind; and 
thanksgiving that we have been saved from the disasters which threatened us.”6 A strict focus on 
national culture and contributions to the arts and sciences helped to reduce the budget, and by 
March 1948, the House of Commons had confirmed Morrison as Lord President and Gerald 
Barry as Director-General of the Festival.7 
 While the new budget cut funding for an international-themed exposition, the scope of 
the Festival remained just as ambitious. By 1951, London’s South Bank Exhibition included 
twenty pavilions that spanned the twenty-seven acres between Nelson Pier, Waterloo Bridge, and 
the southern perimeter of York Road.8 Following the “upstream circuit,” visitors wandered 
between exhibits on the environment, agriculture, production, shipbuilding, and transportation. 
On the other hand, the “downstream circuit” emphasized Britain’s cultural heritage, with 
displays on ancestry, literary history, homes and gardens, education, health, sports, and the 
                                                          
4 Ian Cox, The South Bank Exhibition: A Guide to the Story It Tells (London: HMSO, 1951), 6. 
5 Festival of Britain Office, The Official Book of the Festival of Britain (London 1951), 64.  
6 King George VI to the Lord Mayor of London, 8 June 1949, in The Festival of Britain 1951 (London: A. 
White & Co. Ltd), 1. 
7 Leventhal, “A Tonic to the Nation,” 446-447. Gerald Barry headed the Festival Council, formed of thirty-
two men and women from throughout Britain who represented the associate branches of the Festival. These 
were the Arts Council of Great Britain, the Council of Industrial Design, the British Film Institute, National 
Book League, the Council for Architecture, and the Council for Science and Technology. Barry reported to 
Morrison, who reported to General Lord Ismay, then a member of the House of Lords. 
8  “Festival of Britain 1951: Welcome to London,” by British Railways and London Transport, from 
Imperial War Museum Archives, LBY K. 13/855.  
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seaside. Between the two circuits stood the Dome of Discovery, a colossal structure standing at 
93 feet with a 365-foot diameter.9 Here, displays educated visitors on groundbreaking, British 
contributions to science, industrialization, and exploration, with displays on atomic structures, 
maritime navigation, nuclear energy, and knowledge of outer space, among other subjects. Were 
visitors to grow tired, the South Bank boasted fourteen restaurants and cafés. Were visitors in 
need of lighter entertainment, boats at Nelson Pier offered rides to the Festival Pleasure Gardens 
in Battersea Park. Here, attractions like rollercoasters, carousels, acrobatic shows, theatres, a 
bowling alley, zoo, and a bird sanctuary amused visitors before dinner at one of the twelve 
restaurants and a nighttime fireworks display.10 Altogether, from May 4 to its conclusion that 
September, the South Bank Exhibition saw over eight million visitors, two million of them from 
overseas.11 The South Bank, however, was only the main attraction.  
 In the summer of 1951, festivities occurred throughout the nation. Although the Festival 
Council did not subsidize local efforts to prepare for the Festival, they stressed that “the life and 
work of the British people, the ideas and beliefs which have formed their institutions, [and] their 
achievements…these are the themes of London’s Festival. But with our conception of a national 
autobiography, even the capital city…cannot show the rich diversity of the British genius.”12 In 
this sense, the Festival truly became a nationwide celebration. In the south of England, Brighton 
featured exhibitions on Rudyard Kipling and British literature and hosted an “international 
puppet festival” while Canterbury offered a nightly ballet based on Chaucer’s Canterbury 
                                                          
9 Festival of Britain Office and the Council of Industrial Design, Notes for Industry on the 1951 Exhibition: 
Summary of Industrial Exhibits, Method of Collection, Instructions for Submitting Products to the 1951 
Stock List (London: Fosh and Cross Ltd, 1951), 9.  
10 Leventhal highlights how Copenhagen’s Tivoli Gardens was a model for the Festival’s Pleasure Gardens. 
Leventhal, “A Tonic for the Nation,” 450.   
11 Mary Benham, Christopher Firmstone, Bevis Hillier, A Tonic to the Nation (London: UDO Ltd. Dmd., 
1976), 2. 
12 Festival of Britain Office, The Official Book of the Festival of Britain, 21. 
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Tales.13 In Wales, Cardiff held cricket matches, a Welsh Industries Fair, and the small village of 
Llangollen, “in the beautiful valley of the Dee, with the high country of the North Wales 
mountains marking its horizons,”14 hosted an international Eisteddfodd (arts competition) that 
saw teams compete from twenty-one European countries with 10,000 spectators.15 From here, 
Festivities took place in Bath, Stratford-upon-Avon, Oxford, Cambridge, Liverpool, Manchester, 
and York into Scotland. Edinburgh arranged for orchestral performances, operas, and ballets, and 
Glasgow opened an enormous exhibition on industrial power that featured developments in areas 
like hydroelectricity, civil engineering, and atomic energy. In addition, the Festival Council 
organized for two travelling exhibitions. Whereas the land travelling exhibition stopped in 
Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, and Nottingham, the Festival ship, the HMS Campania, docked 
in ten major cities on the east and west coasts, including Belfast. Overall, the Festival was 
seemingly unavoidable. 
 Declared “a tonic to the nation” after the sacrifice and trauma of the Second World War, 
the Festival nevertheless served other purposes that departed from official marketing schemes.16 
In an official context, “tonic” casted the Festival as an agent of national revival, revitalizing 
“belief and trust in the British way of life” and faith in the future. The term promised brighter 
days ahead, and served as a reward for those who had lived through darker days of the past. 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 47-49.  
14 Ian Cox, The South Bank Exhibition: A Guide to the Story It Tells (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 
1951), 18. 
15 Festival of Britain Office, The Official Book of the Festival of Britain (London 1951), 52. 
16 Public Record Office, London, Work 25/21 (old 3 A2/A3), I. Cox, ‘The Story the Exhibition Tells: F.S. 
Campania, Festival of Britain 1951’ (London: HSMO, 1951): 4, quoted in Conekin, ‘The Autobiography of 
a Nation’: The 1951 Festival of Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 4. Here it should 
be mentioned that historiography on the Festival is scarce. Conekin offers the most comprehensive analysis 
of the Festival, in which she questions its promotion of an egalitarian, utopian Britain in face of political 
divisions between the Labour and Conservative parties. This challenges the notion of a “postwar consensus” 
in British politics. For additional scholarship, see Leventhal, “A Tonic to the Nation” and Barry Turner, 
Beacon for Change: How the 1951 Festival of Britain Shaped the Modern Age (London: Aurum, 2011).  
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“Tonic,” however, suggested a present that left bad memories of the past in the past. This 
sidelined "moments of misery, fear and loss” in order to construct an idealized and less 
distressing account of history.17 In emphasizing confidence in the future, stability in the present, 
and by selecting an agreeable past, the council framed the Festival as a milestone that marked the 
deliverance of Britons from the aftermath of 1945 into a new, modern era of peace and 
prosperity. 
 As such, the Festival projected an image of British solidarity and commitment to the 
nation that the Ministry of Information had used as propaganda during the war. “New Britain,” 
according to Festival, was a strong, contented, and egalitarian nation that had fought off Nazi 
invasion in a collective effort, with an “equality of sacrifice.”18 Accordingly, across class, sex, 
ethnicity, and politics, the threat to British sovereignty united “ordinary Britons” in a resilience 
that transcended moments of immense hardship and suffering. In May and June of 1940, 
commonplace residents of Dover journeyed across the English Channel in rowboats and dinghies 
to rescue stranded British soldiers on the beaches of Dunkirk.19 That summer, the groomed pilots 
of the Royal Air Force rose above the rolling hills of rural England to confront an intrusive 
Luftwaffe.20 And finally, beginning that September, Britons kept calm and carried on as German 
                                                          
17 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 5. 
18 “Equality of sacrifice” assumed that all citizens felt morally obligated to contribute to the war effort. See 
Sonya O. Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939-1945 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 31. 
19 For more on the mythology of Dunkirk, see Connelly, “A Colossal Military Disaster: Dunkirk and the 
Fall of France, May-June 1940” in We Can Take It!, Penny Summerfield, “Dunkirk and the Popular 
Memory of Britain at War, 1940-58,” Journal of Contemporary History 45, no. 4 (2010), Angus Calder, 
“Spitfire Summer: April to September 1940” in The People’s War (New York: Random House, 1969), and 
Martin Alexander, “Dunkirk in Military Operations, Myths and Memories,” in Britain and France in Two 
World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory, edited by Robert Tombs and Emilie Chabal, translated by Emilie 
Chabal (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 93-118. 
20 For more on the mythology of the Battle of Britain, see Connelly, “The Fewest of the Few: the Battle of 
Britain, June-September 1940” in We Can Take It!, Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in British 
Popular Culture, 1850-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), and Paul Addinson, “National Identity and 
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bombs rained upon major cities and industrial centers like London, Coventry, and Glasgow.21 
These three events, historians argue, founded the myth of the Second World War in Britain, 
where “the idea that the British were one people fighting a people’s war dominated popular 
culture, and it is in this vision that continues to inform post-war nostalgia” for a better world.22 
At the Festival, Britons were together once again: in the past, reconstructed present, and into the 
lucrative future.  
  Yet Britain had not fully recovered by 1951. The peace had not lived up to wartime 
hopes and expectations for the postwar future, despite the Labour government’s success in 
founding the welfare state, nationalizing core industries, and ending Marshall Aid in January 
1951.23 Austerity measures lasted well into the late 1940s, where rationing policies carried over 
from the war and subverted a wartime optimism for higher living standards after victory. 
                                                          
the Battle of Britain” in War and the Cultural Construction of Identities in Britain, edited by Barbara Korte 
and Ralf Schneider (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 225-240. 
21 The Blitz came to symbolize a mythical moment of togetherness, where Britons adopted an indefatigable, 
collective conscience to preserve national sovereignty — a disposition that scholars like Lucy Noakes and 
Juliette Pattinson have deemed “Blitz spirit.”  Like Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain, the Blitz transfigured 
and then mythologized ordinary citizens into national heroes, and has since represented the climax of 
“Britain alone,” in which an inherently British resolve to endure challenging conditions grew during a 
period without the aid of foreign allies, and obliged German recalculation and withdrawal. According to 
the myth of classlessness, this British resolve transcended class boundaries. For more on the mythology of 
the Blitz, see Connelly, “London Pride has been handed down to us: the Blitz, September 1940-May 1941” 
in We Can Take It!, Helge Nowak, “Britain, Britishness and the Blitz: Public Images, Attitudes and Visions 
in Times of War,” in War and the Cultural Construction of Identities in Britain, edited by Barbara Korte 
and Ralf Schneider (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 241-259, and Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London: 
Johnathan Cape, 1991). 
22 Rose, Which People’s War?, 21. Scholarship on the myth of the Second World War in Britain is abundant. 
Core works that have helped to shape this thesis, in addition to the ones already cited, include: Lucy Noakes 
and Juliette Pattinson (eds), British Cultural Memory and the Second World War (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014), Olivier Wieviroka, “The British and the Liberation of France,” in Britain and France in 
Two World Wars, edited by Robert Tombs and Emilie Chabal, translated by Emilie Chabal (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), James Heartfield, Unpatriotic History of the Second World War (Alresford: 
Zero Books, 2012), and Malcom Smith, Britain and 1940: History, Myth, and Popular Memory (New York: 
Routledge, 2000). 
23 Information Division of the Treasury and the Central Office of Information for the Festival of Britain, 
Britain Now (London: HMSO, 1951), 2. 
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Winston Churchill and the conservatives had lost the 1945 General Election to Clement Attlee 
because “the British people in their majority obviously longed for a visible end to the war 
experience, for a break with tradition, and for a vision of the future that was recognizably 
different from or better than the past.”24 But fears that another world war would, like the first, 
bring a subsequent period of depression and high unemployment were fortified by protracted 
shortages and a severe economic crisis between 1946 and 1947. Consequently, “attitudes in 
Britain to the recent war were complex and ambivalent and the peace was associated not only 
with the expansion of the welfare state, but also with austerity, difficulty, national exhaustion, 
and decline.”25 Victory in the Second World War became “the nation’s last glory” as the Empire 
disintegrated in South Asia and Britain began to lose its status as a world power.26 Facing 
another general election in 1951, the time was ripe for a nationwide celebration that 
demonstrated the people’s “energy and determination in enriching the present and endowing the 
future.”27 
 In the first years of the war, Britons had, in fact, been preoccupied with their futures. 
There was a strong desire to counteract the possibility of another depression by planning for the 
postwar years well ahead of time. According to Mass Observation surveys beginning as early as 
1941, the public often expressed high hopes for a New Britain which was to arise from the ashes 
of war.28 The vision of an enriched, egalitarian society was “a powerful trope of social 
                                                          
24 Nowak, “Britain, Britishness and the Blitz,” 248. 
25 Wendy Webster, Englishness and Empire, 1939-1965 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 86. 
26 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 11. 
27 Festival of Britain Office, The Official Book of the Festival of Britain, 12. 
28 The public opinion questionnaires and “overheards” of Mass Observation, a British research organization 
founded in 1937, offer valuable insight into the thoughts, hopes, and criticisms of Britons during and after 
the Second World War. Because Mass Observation investigators recorded the sex, age, social class, and, at 
times, occupation of those interviewed, their reports can act as cross-sections of the British public. Their 
“overheards,” or written recordings of eavesdropped conversations, remain ethically controversial despite 
the absence of names, however. Mass Observation coded respondents as follows: male (M) or female (F), 
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transformation that figured prominently in wartime rhetoric.” where the war presented an 
opportunity to guarantee the postwar betterment of the nation. 29 Fighting the people’s war, then, 
enabled the people’s future. Emphasis fell on the longing to construct an egalitarian Britain, 
where the divisive socioeconomic barriers of the prewar years would crumble under pressures 
for greater social mobility and equality in living standards and employment.30 While morale 
decreased as the war continued, the success of the Labour Party in the 1945 General Election 
confirmed that hopes for the postwar era had reached a majority consensus after victory in 
Europe that May.31 Labour’s platform of “Never Again” not only ensured the impossibility of 
another war, but established a sense of security that Britain could not return to prewar 
conditions.32 Adopting socialism, the election revealed, was Britain’s next step to achieve an 
egalitarian society. 
 Of utmost importance, the aspiration for egalitarianism demonstrates that, contrary to the 
myth of a classless, united Britain, there was neither equal opportunity nor disintegrating class 
barriers during the war, it was just the opposite, in fact. As Sonya Rose states, “languages of 
nationhood, of a unitary Britain fighting ‘the People’s War’ fed expressions of class antagonism, 
subverting the very idea of a unitary British identity.”33 While the Luftwaffe did not discriminate 
                                                          
with age estimations at intervals of five. Social classes include the upper-class (A), middle-class (B), skilled 
workers (C), and unskilled workers (D). F40B, for example, is a forty-year-old, middle-class woman.  
29 Rose, Which People’s War?, 33. 
30 For a brief overview of British party politics after the war, see Tony Judt, “The Social Democratic Hour,” 
in Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 370-372. He emphasizes 
the importance of the want for egalitarianism in the 1945 General Election. “It was the manifest justice, the 
unfairness of life before the war that drove…the overwhelming vote for Labour in 1945” (Judt 371). Note 
that this “majority consensus” for egalitarianism does not mean that there was a “postwar consensus” where 
all Britons stood united in domestic political issues. 
31 Stephen Fielding, “What did ‘the People’ want? The Meaning of the 1945 General Election,” The 
Historical Journal 35 no.3 (1992): 623-639. 
32 Ibid., 638. 
33 Rose, Which People’s War?, 68.  
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between aristocrats and working-class civilians when dropping bombs, those with stronger 
socioeconomic standings fared better during the war than unskilled workers sucked into the war 
machine. Angus Calder explains how rationing discrepancies existed between the classes, in 
which those with greater wealth had better access to food, clothing, and scarce goods.34 
Moreover, members of the working class received considerable blame for production crises and 
periods of stagnation, where the upper-classes perceived workers as lazy and indolent.35 Even 
children, evacuated from poor, urban areas into the countryside, faced contempt from wealthier 
families who viewed them as unclean, dimwitted, and undisciplined.36 Although the Ministry of 
Information had sought to construct a myth of a classless society to certify that all citizens were 
contributing equally to the war effort, this agenda did not reflect the reality on the Home Front. 
Nevertheless, civilians still voiced hopes and created expectations for an egalitarian future, and 
in doing so, manufactured their own myth for an affluent, equal, and even classless New Britain 
that never arrived – despite the show put on by the Festival. 
   
This thesis examines the construction of a myth for egalitarianism in Britain during the Second 
World War and exposes challenges to the myth under austerity in the immediate postwar years. 
First and foremost, the thesis engineers the 1951 South Bank Exhibition as a lens through which 
to track a history of hope for and disillusionment with socialist reconstruction legislation, when 
planned and when implemented.37 How did expectations for a better, egalitarian future clash with 
                                                          
34 Angus Calder, The People’s War (New York: Random House, 1969), 404-408. 
35 Rose, Which People’s War?, 59. This thesis will further demonstrate these prejudices through a dockers’ 
strike in October 1945 and a transportation strike in early 1947, considered in Part II. 
36 Ibid., 40-44. Connelly also highlights evacuation prejudices. See “Mr Chamberlain’s Face: September 
1939-May 1940” in We Can Take It!, 42-49.  
37 Although the Festival Council repeatedly emphasized that the Festival was a nationwide endeavor, this 
thesis focuses on the South Bank Exhibition to avoid overreach. Moreover, the Festival Council framed the 
South Bank Exhibition as representative of the nation in its own right. 
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the New Britain delivered by the postwar Labour government? In what ways did this tension 
motivate the organization of a festival for the nation, about the nation? 
 Part I focuses on how the South Bank Exhibition demonstrated the supposed successes of 
socialist reconstruction, successes that fulfilled hopes and expectations for postwar 
egalitarianism. The analysis begins with a look into socialist reconstruction proposals created by 
the political elite during the early war years, with an emphasis on the Beveridge Report of 
November 1942 and how reconstruction talks influenced civilian morale. What then follows is a 
study of planning from the bottom-up, namely, the popularization of reconstruction among the 
masses. Here, the persuasive manifestos of cultural figures like H.G. Wells and George Orwell, 
together with the Soviet alliance in 1941, pushed planning into a utopian phase where the 
legislative formalities of official proposals gave way to desires for increasingly unattainable 
futures. Finally, attention returns to the South Bank as an ultimate assurance that the Labour 
government had achieved the building of a better, egalitarian Britain. As a result, the Festival 
served as a belated victory celebration marking the arrival of “the restored nation.” 
 This representation of postwar Britain, however, was idyllic, and at times, exaggerated 
and synthetic. Part II evaluates why this was so, with consideration given to disillusionment with 
the Labour government following the end of the war. While not all were dissatisfied with 
postwar reconstruction, the inability to see or feel notable progress in the early postwar years 
drained faith in the potential for an egalitarian Britain.38 A nationwide dockers’ strike in the fall 
of 1945 reveals immediate, working-class discontent with postwar living standards, and affirms 
                                                          
38 This thesis focuses on postwar disillusionment as a result of the inability to realize wartime hopes for an 
egalitarian nation. By no means did all Britons disfavor the postwar Labour government. Research at the 
University of Leeds in 2016, for instance, found that British academics consider Clement Attlee (1945-51) 
to be the most successful postwar prime minister. “David Cameron rated third worst Prime Minister since 
end of World War Two,” Independent, 12 October 2016. 
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the continuity of class antagonisms from the war. Next, the 1946 Britain Can Make It Exhibition 
illustrates an early, official attempt to counteract dissatisfaction before the arrival of the welfare 
state. The exhibition seemed to have a promising payoff until crippling economic crises began 
that winter and continued into 1947, suggesting that Britain had reached a point of exhaustion 
and could not fully recover. The analysis ends with an explanation of how the South Bank 
Exhibition acted as an agent of appeasement, attempting to quell unrest and construct a narrative 
of postwar social harmony.  
 And so, the “tonic to the nation” not only sought to provide Britons with a reward for 
their mythologized resilience, but stood as a demonstration of reconstruction’s successes. In this 
way, the South Bank Exhibition attempted to pacify postwar pessimism by confirming the 
fulfillment of wartime hopes for egalitarianism and by giving recognition to those who had 
worked to build a better future. This portrayal of a united, mutually supportive nation stood in 
sharp contrast to the reality waiting outside the entrances to the South Bank. 
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PART I 
Sowing Expectations of Egalitarianism in Wartime Britain 
The downstream circuit at the South Bank Exhibition began with two pavilions that 
explored the diverse composition of Britain’s national heritage and its cultural identity. The first 
pavilion, which the Festival Council named “The People of Britain,” traced the ethnic origins of 
the modern state from the early Celtic and Pict migrations through the Roman, Anglo-Saxon, and 
Norman invasions before the tenth century. In ancient and early medieval history, festival 
planners found their origin story. Modern Britain, they established, was the product of a mixed 
ancestry, of tribes and clans whose descendants have since “contributed to the shaping of such a 
rare miscellany of faces as confronts the visitor in any London bus.”39 From Cromwell through 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the union of England and Scotland in 1707, Britons had 
blended into one united people, grateful for the egalitarian inheritance that their predecessors’ 
sacrifices now provided. 
The second pavilion explained how this common inheritance had helped to form a 
national character, a collective identity and general psyche among the descendants. Named “The 
Lion and the Unicorn,” the pavilion gave life to the lineage, unveiling Britons as “something 
more than the sum of men with ancestors, children in schools, families in homes and gardens, 
[and] patients in hospitals.”40 Occupying nearly 20,000 square feet, the displays inside evoked 
the “compositions of various particular habits, attitudes, instincts, qualities and characteristic 
moods”41 of the island nation, those fundamental traits and shared “ideas which together make 
                                                          
39 Catalogue of Exhibits for the South Bank Exhibition (London 1951), 113. 
40 Ibid., 117.  
41 Ibid., 117. 
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up the British attitude to life.”42 Here, a twenty-foot block of Cotswold stone embodied the 
everyday Briton’s love of freedom. A plaster statue of the White Knight from Lewis Carroll’s 
Through the Looking Glass represented their whimsical nature. Works on display from figures 
like Chaucer and Shakespeare, Dickens and Elliot, reflected a nationwide and worldwide 
appreciation of the British literary tradition.  
The showpiece of the pavilion, however, was an installation featuring two straw figures 
of a lion and a unicorn. Symbols of the political union between England, as the lion, and 
Scotland, as the unicorn, the installation dominated the exhibition entrance and signified a lasting 
accord among formerly warring peoples. The lion and the unicorn pulled with their mouths on 
two ropes attached to the door of a straw cage hanging overhead. Together, the figures succeeded 
in opening the cage door, freeing a flight of plaster doves that extended across the ceiling of the 
pavilion. Upon entering, BBC presenter Christopher Salmon expressed his adoration for the 
display and pavilion, stating “I love its wicker cage, its flight of doves. I love its flowers at the 
entry, detail of its tables and door handles… This pavilion of the Lion and Unicorn is a temple of 
the self, where you can see palpably… the English genius.”43 Salmon’s colleague, Geoffrey 
Boumphrey, was nonetheless skeptical of the installation. “What this means I don’t know, but I 
hope it may be taken to symbolize the hope that out of strife and war comes peace – in which 
case it may be something of an apology for the total omission of any reference to the British 
Armed Forces or even to the Police Force in the South Bank Exhibition.”44 Only six years prior 
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to the Festival’s opening, the Second World War had concluded in Europe and in the Pacific. 
Merely four months before, Britain had stopped receiving Marshall Aid. While the war was over, 
memories of loss and sacrifice continued to shape the national consciousness. 
The Festival was Britain’s true victory celebration, the state-sponsored time to reflect 
upon and admire what the people had preserved in face of fascism. For upon victory, a 
significant percentage of Britons were skeptical that the peace had come to stay – or was even 
achievable, according to the plans put out by the coalition government during the war. One 
woman in Fulham avowed, “I’ve never believed for one single moment that Hitler was dead. I’ve 
always been quite sure he’s still alive. I saw in the paper they’re not sure any of the bodies the 
Russians found are Hitler’s. I’m sure we’re going to hear of him again.”45 More worrying was 
the uncertainty regarding the nation’s fate after the war concluded. To some civilians, June 1945 
did not feel any different to the wartime environment. 48% of women and 20% of men 
interviewed by Mass Observation after the victory admitted feelings of indifference regarding the 
peace, finding that little around them had really changed.46 Moreover, 24% of men were 
discomfited with developments in international politics.47 One lower-class woman, aged thirty, 
stated, “Well it doesn’t seem like the peace to me. The war’s over yet things are getting more 
difficult.”48 Another found peacetime conditions “pretty awful. They’ve cut the working hours 
down, and there’s a shortage of everything.”49 All the same, this pessimism did not stop early 
advocates for the Festival from continuing an unquestionably uphill battle in parliament. As 
Herbert Morrison reminded in April 1951, during a speech at the American Chamber of 
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Commerce in London, “I must say why we are having a Festival of Britain. The British people, 
as we all know, came out of the Second World War victorious with our Allies but weakened, 
scarred and fatigued, by the long and tough stand for freedom... And when they were bang up 
against it all for themselves, for the Commonwealth, they didn’t waver, stood for the faith, and 
believed that they would win, and win they did.”50 The Festival was an opportunity to confirm 
that reconstruction had finally brought peace and that victory was worth the sacrifices after all. 
 As such, the Festival of Britain sought to celebrate two victories. The first was the 
triumph of liberal democracy over fascism, which reaffirmed the strength and willpower of the 
British people that had prevailed through Dunkirk, the Blitz, and Battle of Britain.51 The second 
victory was the success of the Labour government’s reconstruction program, which induced 
similar national resolve when facing austerity measures until 1950. Though the peace had not 
brought instant improvements to standards of living nor had it restored Britain’s status as a world 
power, Labour officials believed that, by 1951, postwar reforms had finally led to national 
recovery if not a better world. Though serving as a reward to Britons for their resilience during 
the war and subsequent economic crises, sponsors had slated the Festival to mirror the expected 
successes of postwar reconstruction as early as 1943.52 Recovery, embodied in the Festival, 
became a promise that the political elite anticipated keeping. And while the initial purpose of the 
Festival was to commemorate the Crystal Palace exhibition, Director General Gerald Barry noted 
in 1952 that “as the progress of the war towards an Allied victory gathered momentum…it 
seemed that in 1951 the war was likely to have been over long enough to enable some valuable 
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demonstration to be made by then of Britain’s progress towards recovery from her prodigious 
war efforts.”53 During the war and austerity years, the Festival was both a goal to work towards 
and a deadline for reconstruction.  
 
Teasing Reconstruction: Morale and the Beveridge Report in Wartime Britain, 1939-1943 
From the destruction wrought by the Luftwaffe upon metropolitan areas from London to 
Coventry to Glasgow, planning for reconstruction served as a political tool to strengthen morale. 
While the Ministry of Information, under the direction of Churchill acolyte Brendan Bracken, 
implemented a propaganda program centered on unity, the aplomb of the British character, and 
the alacrity of civilians to participate in the war machine, morale met challenges through the 
seemingly incessant bombardments of the Blitz. Showing the public that the government was 
thinking about the future, political elites judged, could prompt an increase in morale and 
heighten wartime productivity. Here, legislative frameworks for reconstruction were a new 
source of incentive, offering public benefits on the condition that Britain won the war. A Plan for 
Britain, released in 1941, called for universal social security, a minimum wage, and government-
sponsored allowances for families with children.54 Sir Patrick Abercrombie, a professor of town 
planning at University College London, unveiled his County of London Plan in 1943 and Greater 
London Plan in 1944.55 Compiled as the Abercrombie Plan, the proposals encouraged the 
demolition of Victorian tenements, an expansion of parkland in the city center, and introduced 
new methods to minimize pollution. It was the Beveridge Report, however, that stole the show. 
Advocating for obligatory social insurance for all British citizens, the report offered “in return 
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for a flat-rate weekly contribution, flat-rate benefits...made for sickness, unemployment, old age, 
maternity, industrial injury, orphanhood, and widowhood.”56 Upon publication in 1942, no less 
than 86% of respondents to a Gallup survey supported it.57 Planning for an egalitarian future had 
become the latest addition to wartime Britain’s propaganda apparatus. 
 And yet, although planning schemes for reconstruction often adopted egalitarian agendas, 
socioeconomic discrepancies remained just as prevalent in wartime Britain as in the interwar 
years. As George Orwell asked in his 1941 essay, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the 
English Genius, “Is not England notoriously two nations, the rich and the poor? Dare one pretend 
that there is anything in common between people with £100,000 a year and people with £1 a 
week?”58 As the resignation of Neville Chamberlain in May 1940 showed, there was not. 
Associated with the old-fashioned political aristocracy, Chamberlain became “a symbol of all 
that was muddleheaded, incompetent, irresponsible, complacent, and, indeed, ludicrous about the 
first nine months of the war.”59 From his policies of appeasement to his perceived weakness as a 
wartime leader, especially given the failure of the Norwegian campaign in April 1940, 
Chamberlain’s reputation plummeted. In his place stood Churchill, heralded as “the finest leader 
we have ever had and…a friend of the working class. He is not a snob like Chamberlain.”60 
Notwithstanding this, a 1943 questionnaire on “Industrial Feelings” by Mass Observation 
suggests that not all workers were satisfied to be part of the Prime Minister’s war machine. 
                                                          
56 Robert Mackay, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britian during the Second World War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), 231. 
57 The British Institute of Public Opinion, The Beveridge Report and the Public (1943), quoted in Mackay, 
Half the Battle, 233. 
58  George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1941), 25. 
59 Mark Connelly, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (Pearson: Harlow, 
2004), 31. 
60 Mass Observation Archive, File Report SxMOA/1/2/53/1/F, ‘Beveridge Report: Diary Extracts,’ 
December 1942. 
Nilsen 21 
 
 
While 63% of men and 44% of women interviewed believed that industry was working 
efficiently, workers felt undervalued.61 76% of men and 75% of women thought that workers 
should have more say in the management of their workplace, and 43% of men and 40% of 
women found their salaries too low.62 Moreover, 52% of men and 43% of women thought that 
their employers’ profits were too high.63 This sought-after betterment of working conditions 
undoubtedly propelled workers to support reconstruction plans that called for a disintegration of 
class inequities. For the moment, they were cogs in the machine. 
  Socioeconomic imbalances did not necessarily create a climate of pessimism on the 
home front, but produced caution and hesitancy when voicing hopes for the future. Nevertheless, 
some civilians confessed a complete lack of faith for postwar conditions, with one 50-year-old 
working-class man predicting national bankruptcy and another stating pessimistically, “There’ll 
always be unemployment.”64 When Mass Observation asked one woman her opinions on the 
alliance with the Soviet Union, she said, “I’ve hardly turned on the radio since Russia started. 
Everything is so depressing…I don’t believe it [the war] will ever stop at all…If ever there is a 
bit of good news they can’t let you enjoy it, they have to keep hammering in that everything is 
going to get worse and worse and we musn’t feel hopeful.”65 This sense of desperation is 
particularly noteworthy given the interviewer’s estimation of the woman’s age, near twenty. She 
had not experienced world war before. Those who had experienced the First World War, on the 
contrary, knew that the war would end, but expressed reservation about its aftermath. In an essay 
competition on postwar hopes held by the British Legion, RAF pilot E.H. Longshaur wrote: 
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“Although everyone has practiced ideas on how to survive in the postwar era, it can safely be 
said they all look back to pre-war days and will continue to do so, to what could have been.”66 
Even one woman who had grown up during the interwar years had learned that “we were 
promised so much after the last war. It’s best not think about it [the future].”67 For some, the 
specter of economic stagnation, unemployment, and shortages that followed 1918 provided little 
room for unreserved optimism concerning the future. 
 For others, Great Britain was on the threshold of becoming a socialist Cibola. “Huge 
changes” were on the horizon, changes that brought equal opportunity and no unemployment, 
free healthcare, better pensions at sixty, better housing, better wages, and government support for 
large families, widows, and veterans.68 As one man stated in an August 1942, “Well — I don’t 
think there’d be the depression there was after the last war. If they can afford the war they can 
afford the peace.”69 The interwar years were a valuable lesson, and the government was prepared 
for the next epoch of British triumph, where “the example of failure…should only be an 
incentive to a greater determination to achieve success now.”70 One woman dreamt of an 
increase in pensions, so that “old folks…if they buy tobacco or go to the cinema they haven’t got 
to deny themselves something in food.”71 A second expected “all the slums [to be] demolished 
for one thing, every house to have a bath, and the men to have work.”72 New Britain consisted of 
modern flats, shopping centers, planned residential neighborhoods, and practical consumer 
goods. Houses needed gardens, flats needed controlled rents, and towns needed to be “modern, 
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clean, sanitary, compact, and not to be a burden on the taxpayer.”73 While one civilian wished for 
a “sunshine house, [with] one room to go the length of the house, and the other part to be divided 
for a hall kitchen and pantry, and three bedrooms and a bathroom upstairs, with a small 
garden,”74 another hoped for “a home of which I can be proud and in which I can, with my wife 
and family, enjoy the freedom to which we have contributed our sacrifices.”75 In return for the 
austere and unyielding conditions that they had faced since the First World War, civilians 
contributing to the war effort expected the government to lift financial burdens after the peace 
and finally balance living standards across the classes. 
 Enter the Beveridge Report, what Sir Ronald Davison, a civil servant, described as a 
piece of moral legislation that embodied “the creative idealism of our British democracy and its 
practical plans for a higher social order than any other country has yet dreamed of.”76 Penned by 
economist Sir William Beveridge and published in November 1942, the report proposed 
universal social insurance that applied to “every citizen, rich and poor, young and old.”77 It 
promised the erosion of class boundaries and provided a foundation for a more egalitarian 
postwar society. Following the establishment of a Ministry of Social Security and insurance 
reform, the plan in theory divided British citizens into six classes of contributors based upon 
income level. Class I consisted of steady wage earners, who paid the highest weekly rates in 
order to receive benefits. Class II included shopkeepers, traders, independent workers, Class III 
housewives and married women under sixty-five, Class IV unemployed students and single 
women over sixteen, with Class V being children under fifteen and Class VI being retirees above 
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sixty-five. Yet only victory allowed for the installation of the plan – victory in the war, and 
victory in the House of Commons. In 1943, Davison reminded that “even within our country to 
win this goal of social security will call for self-sacrifice and a high sense of national unity and 
citizenship.”78 The adoption of the welfare state, he believed, required a national determination 
like the resilience fashioned under the strain of the war. Yet some Britons believed the report 
would provide instant relief from their pains after the war, and did not question its cost.  
That December, a Mass Observation survey confirmed that the Beveridge Report 
attracted interest from a wide range of the British public, with approval transcending income 
levels. A clerk told of how, the previous month, he “joined a long queue outside the Stationery 
Office [near Kingsway] to obtain a copy…the people queueing represented a good cross section 
of the British public. I saw a policeman, a business man, a girl typist, an ARP [Air Raid 
Precaution] rescue worker, an army captain, and two men close to me were Frenchmen.”79 Not 
only had the report managed to capture the curiosity of military personnel, white collar and 
public sector workers, and men and women, but had even compelled foreigners to pick up a 
copy. Approval for the report came from a heterogeneous audience as well. One middle-class 
man proclaimed that the report “is the greatest measure of social reform of the century and 
should be passed into law at the earliest possible moment.”80 A middle-class housewife 
expressed that “if it should be adopted and prove workable it will change the whole face of life 
for working people and remove the main fears of their lives.”81 In this sense, the report truly 
offered a pioneering agenda that provided liberation for the lower classes from the ingrained, 
socioeconomic inflexibility of interwar Britain. It became “the working man’s Magna Carta,” 
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according to one shopkeeper, in that the plan acknowledged the underprivileged conditions that 
struggling wage earners faced and introduced policies to diminish socioeconomic imbalances.82 
When interviewed, a retired policeman voiced his support simply because the plan gave 
protection to disadvantaged Britons. “I consider it hard for us…who have never suffered from 
unemployment to realise what a nightmare the absence of security is to many decent working 
men. I sincerely hope they will secure it in the post war world.”83 The Beveridge Report revealed 
that the government had begun to consider the welfare of all citizens, and most importantly, the 
betterment of their lives following the war.  
 All the same, the plan had its skeptics. One upper-class housewife was particularly 
peeved when she attended a luncheon and got into “a real ding dong argument” with a Miss 
Woods and Miss Waite: “Talking of Beveridge and his ‘plan’ I was somewhat astonished to hear 
their attitude. They took the somewhat contemptuous line that he was a Liberal and it was 
‘another 9d for 4d’ and saw nothing good in it…To hear Miss Waite’s remarks I must have been 
a moron, incapable of coherent thoughts.”84 Standard criticisms centered on Beveridge’s 
sanguine ideals for the postwar period, and saw the report as both unattainable and as an artificial 
incentive to motivate workers for the wartime economy. This was the “minority who saw it as a 
carrot, the people being the donkey.”85 At a public debate held in Stratford in 1942, between a 
local Labour MP and Alexander Anderson, a conservative MP from the Midlands, the report’s 
unrealistic expectations formed the basis of Anderson’s criticism. He revealed that between 1938 
and 1939 Britain spent £342,000,000 on social security; Beveridge’s plan required a spending 
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budget of £697,000,000 by 1945.86 Likewise, one insurance agent “thought the report was a sop, 
intended to allay the people’s fears about the future,”87 and a woman admitted that her husband 
told her it was “a clever bourgeois pseudo-reform.”88 A Mrs. G found the report “merely a way 
of keeping people quiet… It’s ridiculous to give anyone £20 for dying but only £4 for being 
born.”89 This references the increased support the report ventured to give to parents upon the 
birth of a child and to children upon the death of a parent. As a clerk stated, “We are inclined to 
spend too much on funerals – especially the working class. I always remember the look of horror 
of the undertaker when Pop died and I arranged for his funeral. When in response to his enquiry 
as to what sort of coffin was required I said ‘the cheapest.’”90 While these criticisms show that 
not all accepted the Beveridge Report at face value, those who praised the plan nevertheless 
outnumbered those who expressed disapproval. 
 Because the report showed that the government had begun to consider postwar 
conditions, offered a window into a new, egalitarian Britain, and outlined policies to better 
standards of living for all income levels, Sir William Beveridge succeeded in raising public 
morale in the middle of the Second World War. Following the Stratford debate, an audience 
member named E. P. Ray commented that the report “indicates that there are men concerning 
themselves with the problems we shall have to face after the war and it is clear that the mind and 
the heart have been allowed to produce something of tremendous help to those who follow us.”91 
The Beveridge Report exhibited that Britain was venturing into a fresh, modern era that 
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distanced the island nation from the stifling interwar years and retrograde Victorian class system. 
Seeing the opportunities lying ahead pushed Britons to fight for the future. In December 1942, a 
retired schoolteacher stated that the Beveridge Report “revived my faith and made me ashamed 
of my defeatist attitude…the people of Britain had organised and determined themselves for 
victory in making a better Britain after the war.”92 A clerk remarked, “What tremendous 
opportunities are offered if only we can fight for them. It looks as if, after all, something good 
may come out of this war…I feel quite inspired.”93 As the critics had observed, the report acted 
as an incentive – however genuinely Beveridge believed in establishing a welfare state. When a 
farm worker expressed his support for the insurance scheme to his wife, she was skeptical, he 
noted. She “says afterwards, ‘Why not get on with the war first’ but when I point out that a lot of 
people are (perhaps subconsciously) not putting their best into winning the war because they fear 
unemployment and insecurity after it, she does see there is something in that.”94 As a housewife 
stated in her diary, “Never since I’ve listened to a speaker on air did I feel as interested as I did 
tonight to Sir W. Beveridge – I’ll feel a bit more hopeful about the ‘brave new world’ now and 
begin to feel real [original emphasis] effort will be made to grasp the so different angles of the 
many problems.”95 Suddenly, there was an objective to winning the war that benefited the lives 
of everyday Britons, an objective that provided secure material and financial benefits. The report 
was proof that New Britain was on its way. 
 Like A Plan for Britain and the Abercrombie Plan, the 1942 Beveridge Report served as a 
tombstone marking popular departure of prewar Britain’s aristocratic order. The report arrived 
when workers began to feel discontented with the conditions of the war machine, and when hope 
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for the postwar future had not evaporated but met reservations based upon the austere 
environment that had followed 1918. When Britons began to show increasing approval for an 
elaborate, postwar welfare system and for a socialist government, the report confirmed that these 
wishes were possible and even realistic ones. Garnering support across income levels, the report 
advocated for a regrowth centered on resolving modern socioeconomic imbalances that had 
existed in Britain since early industrialization. The report acknowledged that the working and 
middle classes had suffered from financial insecurity and inadequate living standards, 
particularly after the First World War, but this time, the political elite had a plan. In this sense, 
knowing that the government was beginning to think about and plan for the future provided the 
public with more incentive to contribute to the war effort, in order to achieve the goals set out in 
the Beveridge Report. As a teacher commented in December 1942, “It’s extraordinary that the 
government has let the cat out of the bag…it has been set forth in a government report that 
security is possible if human needs are a first charge. The quotation from Marx is apt – ‘war is 
the locomotion of history.’”96 With increased morale and heightened willingness to achieve 
visions assembled by wartime planning schemes, Britain’s war machine pushed on with the 
target of an egalitarian future. 
 
Selling Reconstruction: Utopianism, and Looking East in Wartime Britain, 1941-43 
The Beveridge Report turned postwar planning into a public interest. As of 1943, “there were 
more than one hundred unofficial organizations studying and putting out ideas and proposals on 
different aspects of post-war reconstruction: land and town planning, industry and economics, 
agriculture, housing and public amenities, education, medicine and health.”97 Encouraged and 
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even empowered by the progressive broadcasts of H.G. Wells and socialist prophecies of George 
Orwell, Britons at the Home Front became more vocal about their expectations and suggestions 
for the postwar future.  As such, there occurred a transition in the nature of planning, in which 
the political elite continued to release top-down reconstruction proposals yet to audiences that 
had started their own informal, populist dialogues. This ushered in increasingly wide-ranging 
visions for postwar Britain, where the 1941 alliance with the Soviet Union continued to generate 
sympathies for Stalin, the Red Army, and war in the east.98 Cooperation between Britain and the 
Soviet Union, while facing some dissent, nevertheless drew attention to communist frameworks 
for governance and social order, those that, some Britons perceived, had repelled the Nazis from 
Moscow with a functioning, classless society. The emerging tendency to look to the Soviet 
Union as a model for reconstruction, in order to lessen socioeconomic imbalances in modern 
Britain, thus characterized a utopian phase in reconstruction planning powered by the working 
class. War was the locomotion of history. 
 Wells began broadcasting his visions for the future on the BBC in 1931. Deemed “the 
father of science fiction” due to his commercial successes such as The Time Machine (1895) and 
The War of the Worlds (1898), Wells was also a political theorist whose frameworks for the 
future were grounded in the very real issues facing modern Britain during the interwar and 
wartime years.99 On November 23, 1939, three months after Britain and France declared war on 
Germany, the BBC called on Wells to speak at a “literary luncheon” at Foyles bookstore in 
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London.100 He was to introduce Edvard Beneš, the then-exiled prime minister of Czechoslovakia, 
who emphasized the need for the West to begin planning the democratic reconstruction of a post-
fascist Germany. First, Sir Ronald Storrs, an official at the British Foreign and Colonial Office, 
introduced Wells as “a prophet to whom it has been vouchsafed from early middle age to see his 
prophecies come true. Forty years ago, he foretold the airplane, the wireless, babble machines he 
calls them, billowing news from their foolish trumpet faces – no offense to BBC representatives 
here today.”101 This introduction demonstrates how Wells was not only a voice for the future, but 
a voice of the future, one whose visions were attainable and impending. In his own introduction, 
Wells praised the loyalty of Beneš in helping to restore a free Europe. Beneš was a noble 
politician who “has had all Europe in vision” and seeks “greater unity” between European 
nations.102 Wells looked forward to when Beneš and other politicians would have the privilege of 
“reshaping and reorganizing our world.”103 In 1945, Wells would once again prove his “gift.”104 
 Wells’ January 1943 broadcast, Reshaping Man’s Heritage, was an appeal for the 
founding of a postwar egalitarian Britain. The nation had a chance, Wells believed, to adopt a 
reconstruction program that abolished toxic class differences and gave equal opportunities for 
employment and education to all citizens. Moreover, Britain was the precedent for constructing a 
worldwide political community focused on equality and the “scrapping of our inheritance of hate 
and aggression.”105 These outlooks translated well into the public conscience, where socialist 
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sentiments continued to brew after the release of the Beveridge Report two months earlier. 
“There has been a world of masters and men,” said Wells, “what the Israelis called two 
nations…There is no choice before mankind but a worldwide control of production and 
power.”106 A global organization that managed labor and output would once and for all conclude 
the ugly chapter of history built on the sweat of “unskilled workers and such like toilers.”107 New 
Britain would lead the charge in eliminating “the old social pyramid” as “mankind has no further 
use for serfs and slaves. The new world must be therefore an equal, egalitarian society.”108 The 
liberation of occupied Europe and founding of a new world order would complement the 
emancipation of the working classes from the burden of fueling competition between 
industrialized economies. As such, Reshaping Man’s Heritage strengthened leftist dreams in 
wartime Britain, particularly the desire to usher in socialist principles to sew a widening gap 
between classes. Just as Britain had acquired the television and wireless, so would Britain 
introduce universal egalitarianism, the “rehabilitation” of the world.  
 For Orwell, too, war provided a platform for egalitarian reform. The election of 1940 had 
resulted in the defeat of the old aristocracy, whose incompetence had left Hitler undeterred in 
pushing into Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. As Orwell exclaimed in The Lion and the 
Unicorn, “The mishandling of England’s domestic problems during the nineteen-twenties had 
been bad enough, but British foreign policy between 1931 and 1939 is one of the wonders of the 
world. Why? What had happened? What was it that at every decisive moment made every British 
do the wrong thing with so unerring an instinct?”109 He later concludes, “What is to be expected 
of them [the ruling class] is not treachery or physical cowardice, but stupidity, unconscious 
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sabotage…They are not wicked, nor altogether wicked; they are merely unteachable.”110 The 
aristocracy, Orwell believed, represented the England of 1840, a class that was anachronistic and 
unequipped to direct a modern government, let alone orchestrate modern warfare. Gone were the 
days of top hats, tailcoats, and elitist parliamentary politics; now, the people were on the verge of 
political control. “If it can be made clear that defeating Hitler means wiping out class privilege, 
the great mass of middling people, the £6 a week to £2000 a year class, will probably be on our 
side.”111 The postwar era allowed for a reconfiguration of the British social order, one that 
removed from the nation gross financial inequities that had existed since early industrialization, 
from the England of 1840.112 Like the prophecies of Wells, Orwell’s future envisioned a 
transition of power from the old elites into the hands of the masses, for the benefit of the masses.  
Socialism was the viable doctrine that allowed this shift to occur. To achieve an 
egalitarian Britain, Orwell believed that it was the people’s responsibility to foster mass 
enthusiasm and found the movement. These enthusiasts he considered modern, living in “vast 
new wildernesses of glass and brick [where] the sharp distinctions of the older kind of town, with 
its manor-houses and squalid cottages, no longer exist… To that civilization belong the people 
who are most at home and most definitely are of the modern world, the technicians and higher-
paid skilled workers, the airmen and their mechanics, the radio experts, film producers, popular 
journalists and industrial chemists.”113 Although Orwell found that Britain had retained past 
traits that enforced contemporary class divisions, the patriotic unity generated by the war was 
also capable of rallying Britons to join the socialist cause, to transcend class difference. Like the 
war effort, socialism was a movement for the people, by the people. Moreover, the establishment 
                                                          
110 Ibid., 43-44. 
111 Ibid., 97. 
112 Ibid., 12. 
113 Ibid., 54. 
Nilsen 33 
 
 
of an egalitarian future was at the heart of the fight against fascism. Orwell states, “Socialism 
aims, ultimately, at a world-state of free and equal human beings. It takes the equality of human 
rights for granted. Nazism assumes just the opposite. The driving force behind the Nazi 
movement is the belief in human inequality, the superiority of Germans to all other races, the 
right of Germany to rule the world.”114 In battling against inequality, then, Orwell argues that 
Britons were already fighting for egalitarianism. With encouragement, the people’s war would 
yield the people’s future. And yet, despite his assurance that this future was realistic and 
achievable, The Lion and the Unicorn – like the prophecies of Wells and the publication of the 
Beveridge Report – motivated the masses to view the war as an opportunity to add their voices to 
the conversation on planning, in some cases creating utopian expectations. 
The 1941 alliance with the Soviet Union enabled these egalitarian dreams to develop, 
first strengthening British sympathies for their anti-fascist comrades of the east. A 1941-42 Mass 
Observation survey on attitudes to Russia revealed how this rapport had progressed. M45D 
found Russia “a damn fine country” and observed the sudden change in public sentiment, 
recalling how “before the war we through [sic] dust on them, as if they were a lot of heathens. 
Called them Bolshies and what not.”115 M45C furthered this, announcing it “a great pity that the 
Imperialistic bias against her was so prominent in the Tory Government before the War and if 
this had not existed and we had treated them as equals, as they deserved, this War most likely 
would never have happened.”116 With the alliance, official antagonisms had disappeared and the 
coalition began to emphasize wartime unity with the communists. As such, civilians found 
parallels between themselves and Soviet citizens. When Mass Observation showed M60B 
                                                          
114 Ibid., 63. 
115 Mass Observation File Report SxMOA/1/2/25/4/A, ‘Russia,’ November 1942. 
116 Ibid.  
Nilsen 34 
 
 
photographs of soldiers in the Red Army, for example, he remarked, “They’re very like English 
people, those Russians. More like than either the Germans or the French.”117 F40D saw Russians 
as “a wonderful lot of people”118 and M55D even advocated that “the co-operation of our 
country with this [the Soviet government] in time of peace would be to the benefit of all of those 
whose ambition was lasting peace and goodwill.”119 Attitudes like these, underlining 
commonalities, warmth, or enduring accord, helped to foster pro-Soviet mindsets among some 
sectors of the population. Sympathy for Stalin and the Red Army brought attention to communist 
models of governance and social organization among Britons who saw the war as a chance for 
national revival.  
Looking eastward for reconstruction carried planning schemes beyond the formalities of 
elite blueprints for the future. This phenomenon embodies the shift in the nature of planning, 
from top-down reconstruction proposals to those generated from the public. F25B stated, “I’d 
like to see things very much like Russia, with all class barriers down, free education for all, and 
equal chances for rich and poor.”120 F40D expressed a similar wish, stating, “I find their system 
of government is very good. Everybody has the same opportunity of rising to the top, and the 
working classes are not used as stepping-stones by those better off. We should have that system 
of government.”121 In this sense, misunderstandings of everyday life in the Soviet Union were 
characteristic of utopian planning, in which some Britons perceived Stalin’s regime as a 
prosperous, classless society, or a haven for the exploited worker. As the Daily Worker 
proclaimed as early as January 1940, the Red Army functioned as an “army of liberation” that, 
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upon invasion of Belorussia and Western Ukraine, propelled 2,000 peasants and workers into the 
state apparatus and found jobs for 16,800 unemployed.122 As such, the Soviet Union seemed like 
a paradise for those who had suffered from a lack of security during the interwar years. F50D 
saw Russia as “an ideal country for the likes of us to live in. I wish we poor people were thought 
of the same here…In Russia I am told you are always provided for by giving you work or 
maintaining you decently – also when a worker is run down he is sent away to a rest-centre to 
regain his health.”123 Finally, the Soviet Union offered a model for egalitarianism beyond class 
difference. A housewife recalled how a friend believed “this country [Britain] should undergo a 
revolution and approximate to the Russian system – both husband and wife go out to work, and 
contribute equally to the upkeep of the home.”124 Restructuring Britain through a Soviet model 
did not merely free unskilled workers, but liberated women as well. These exaggerations of 
Soviet egalitarianism, however, undermined desires to adopt a communist model for postwar 
reconstruction. 
Indeed, the alliance also produced both distrust of the USSR and criticism of its 
oppressive policies. This counterbalanced the movement to look eastward for reconstruction, but 
did not deter the hopes and expectations induced by the Beveridge Report. What distinguished 
Britain from the Soviet Socialist Republics, according to M65B, was force, which he called “the 
antithesis of liberty. Its [the USSR’s] industrial and social systems are equally based on the 
negation of individualism and individual liberty. The ‘freedom’ for which Red Russia fights is 
not the freedom which Britons cherish and fight for.”125 Such was the sentiment of others who 
expressed doubt about a lasting cooperation between the two powers. Not only was Soviet 
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authority flawed in using force and terror as the foundation for control, but Stalin was generally 
deemed untrustworthy as an ally. M50B conceded that “one must give Russia their due as fine 
soldiers and an heroic people…but they did not come in on our side until it suited their book.”126 
M60C agreed: “Don’t think the Russians are to be trusted. They are not fighting to help us but to 
help themselves. If Germany invaded Britain, Russia would have invaded Germany and so 
carried on their aim…of world domination.”127 Suspicions of Soviet motivations, and 
perceptions of inherent, uncompromising differences between the countries, challenged dreams 
for a communist future. 
On the other hand, as Orwell suggested, Britain needed a reconstruction cocktail that fit 
the nation’s political and cultural values. While The Lion and the Unicorn incentivized the public 
add their voices to planning, Orwell highlighted the obligation of adopting a postwar model that 
worked for the unique composition of British society: those “who hope to see it [Britain] 
Russianized or Germanized will be disappointed. The gentleness, the hypocrisy, the 
thoughtlessness, the reverence for law and the hatred of uniforms will remain, along with the 
suet puddings and the misty skies.”128 Neither a Russian nor a German prototype could resolve 
British class discrepancies, because they did not take into account the existing conditions shaping 
or inhibiting the potential for progress at home. According to Orwell, practical programs of 
reform included the nationalization of major industries and ensuring equal opportunities in 
education and employment.129 Socialism, Orwell affirmed, was not a utopian concept. It did not 
require a bloodthirsty uprising against the propertied class, and, as Davison remarked following 
the Beveridge Report, socialism “is far more likely to make the British into a nation of small 
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capitalists rather than a propertyless socialist proletariat.”130 It provided securities and equal 
opportunity, what most Britons felt lacking during the interwar years. As RAF pilot, Reginald 
John Willis, reflected, “A strong Britain, a free Britain, a Britain with beautiful and happy 
homes, is a land which is not hard to visualize… I am convinced beyond all doubt that what the 
average fighting man wants more than anything else in the world today is a job at which he is 
happy, a good home, and freedom of thought, speech, and religion.”131 If the postwar world 
offered employment, better housing, and the continuity of democratic rights, the peace was worth 
the fight. It was attainable. Looking to the Soviet Union, Orwell found, was a distraction. 
Finding inspiration from the postwar futures envisioned by popular authors like Wells 
and Orwell, the public heightened their hopes and expectations for a New Britain founded upon 
socialist principles. Increasing sympathy for the Red Army and warmth to the Soviet Union as a 
wartime ally generated a phase in planning that brought attention to communist prototypes for 
political and social organization. Looking to the east for reconstruction resulted in a utopian 
epoch of planning, in which some Britons perceived the Soviet Union as having achieved an 
egalitarian society that liberated unskilled workers from corrupt bosses and women from 
domestic confines. Notwithstanding, these planners received backlash from those who distrusted 
Stalin’s agenda and who emphasized the need to have practical expectations for the postwar 
period. As such, Orwell denounced these utopian dreamers, affirming that “another marked 
characteristic [of the left-wing intelligentsia] is the emotional shallowness of people who live in 
a world of ideas and have little contact with physical reality.”132 Britain needed a socialist 
reconstruction program that focused on the betterment of society through its existing political 
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and cultural framework, that originated from national traditions, that allowed Britain to still be 
Britain. 
 
Reconstruction Confirmed: Presenting “New Britain” at the 1951 South Bank Exhibition 
In May of 1951, the millionth visitor entered the South Bank Exhibition in London. Little did 
Betty Dark expect a crowd to suddenly congregate around her, exclaiming that she would be 
“Queen of the Festival for the day.”133 Handed a pristine Festival guide, the same copy presented 
to King George VI at the opening ceremony, officials escorted the visitor to the Royal Pavilion 
where she posed for photographs. After spending the day with her fiancé, she reflected upon her 
experience with BBC host G. Talbot. What stood out to her were the morning festivities 
surrounding her arrival, and the steak that she ordered for lunch. She explains, “Well I just took 
one look at this steak and thought well I’ll never eat all that. It was such a delicious looking 
steak. I’ll always remember the looking at it all my life.”134  
Like the Festival, the steak marked the departure of the war, of austerity, and the advent 
of a New Britain. It was lavish and resplendent. It was appetizing. It was an unforgettable 
moment of luxury that was, nevertheless, exceptional and – pardon the pun – rare in reality. For 
although the Festival sought to celebrate the achievement of constructing a better and more 
egalitarian nation, demonstrating the successes of postwar reconstruction and bringing the 
people’s peace, it remained a polished attraction rather than an authentic representation of 
postwar Britain. Being “one united act of national reassessment and one corporate reaffirmation 
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of faith in the nation’s future,”135 the Festival wanted to confirm that the people’s wartime 
expectations for the future had been enacted by the postwar Labour government. It was a show 
of continuity and of progress, where the South Bank Exhibition’s pavilions reflected a national, 
industrial revival, housing redevelopment, the implementation of the welfare state, and modern 
aesthetics. Exhibitions on industry revealed new employment opportunities, those on housing 
signified the reunion of the family, those on welfare reflected the postwar, egalitarian standard, 
and the overall appearance of the South Bank presented Britain as a flourishing, modern nation. 
The Festival, then, was the ultimate victory celebration, an affirmation of the end of war, of the 
triumphs of reconstruction, of the greater future realized. All the same, the South Bank was a 
glitzy utopia – delicious to digest, but offering only temporary satisfaction before returning to 
1951 through the exhibition’s turnstiles. 
While the South Bank Exhibition remained the most popular attraction of the Festival, the 
committee encouraged the planning of a nationwide celebration. It envisioned the Festival as 
“the work of not one city but of the whole nation.”136 As such, they organized a land traveling 
exhibition, featuring displays on industrial design, production, scientific discoveries, and the 
British home, which stopped in Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, and Nottingham. Consisting of 
over 3,000 objects, the exhibition accumulated to 35,000 square feet.137 Furthermore, the Festival 
ship, the HMS Campania, traveled up the east and west coasts, making appearances at ten major 
cities from Southampton to Dundee and Plymouth to Belfast and Glasgow. The committee 
moreover urged local governments to organize their own festivities, claiming that the Festival 
was an opportunity to reinvigorate provincial towns and villages from the war and austerity 
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years. And yet, the South Bank Exhibition drew the largest crowds. A schoolmistress from 
Gloucester commented that she “would’ve liked a week to see it…and to have gone in and come 
out at leisure and rested my feet at intervals… There was much more than I thought there was 
going to be.”138 Rather than undertaking a nationwide tour, the South Bank Exhibition allowed 
its eight million visitors to get the full Festival experience.  
Indeed, the South Bank Exhibition remained the heart of the Festival, despite statements 
to the contrary. Even though the guide reminds, “With our conception of a national 
autobiography… the capital city of the kingdom and the Commonwealth cannot show the rich 
diversity of the British genius,” London represented the nation as a whole. Halls and pavilions 
addressed the British people, not the English, the Scots, the Welsh, or the Irish.139 They called 
attention to industrial, political, and cultural developments that came from all areas of the British 
Isles. In this way, the South Bank was able to affirm a nationwide revival and a continuous 
cultural ascendancy. The inclusion of the monarchy into the Festival program helped to promote 
these ideas, where “the national character of the Festival was confirmed by the patronage and 
involvement of the Royal Family at every stage from an address by Princess Elizabeth at the 
Royal Society of Arts as early as May 1948 and the official opening at St Paul’s Cathedral on 3 
May 1951, to the closing of the South Bank Exhibition at the end of September.”140 The South 
Bank Exhibition celebrated British culture, British industry, and of utmost importance, Britons 
themselves. It then embodied what the Archbishop of Canterbury highlighted of the Festival in 
July 1950, namely “our belief and trust in the British way of life… with sober and humble trust 
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that by holding fast to that which is good and rejecting from our midst that which is evil we may 
continue to be a nation at unity in itself and of service to the world.”141 The South Bank 
Exhibition was illustrative of New Britain, and of the people’s faith and connection to this future, 
this victory, now ostensibly achieved. 
 The upstream circuit presented industrial revival and fortitude, confirming the successes 
of reconstruction in expanding employment opportunities and prosperity. Whereas the 
downstream pavilions focused on British cultural traditions and modern life, upstream pavilions 
emphasized development in agriculture and farming, and mining to produce metals, wood, 
rubber, plastics, pottery, glass, textiles, and food. The upstream circuit also included a pavilion 
on maritime power, stressing that “Britain builds more ships and a greater variety of them than 
any other nation,” along with transportation pavilion with displays on roads, railways, airplanes, 
and telecommunication.142 The Council of Industrial Design covered all bases while carefully 
selecting items worthy of show. Here, each pavilion needed to express the important 
contributions of a particular industry to British “civilization” while exhibiting the boom of the 
industry itself. The council stated that “a subjected quantifying for inclusion must be one in 
which the British contribution is outstanding – such an invention like penicillin or the jet engine; 
an unrivalled British craft like tailoring or fine china; a current national enterprise like the 
equipment of new schools” et cetera. In presenting a particular achievement of British industry, 
the council exhibited an industry’s supposed postwar vitality. This suggested that reconstruction 
had offered  
A solution...in the replanning of the distribution of industry so that new and profitable 
work is brought to where the people live. The heavy industries must stay tied to the 
locality of one, at least, of their raw materials. The lighter industries, however, can be 
located near the great centres of our population, and this is the principle of the planned 
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development in operation today. These lighter industries, being very varied, can be 
balanced so that useful work is there for all sections of the population.143 
 
According to the upstream circuit, citizens had access to employment to contribute to New 
Britain while enjoying job security and increased wealth. Reconstruction had brought 
employment to them.  
 Furthermore, the Homes and Gardens Pavilion of the downstream circuit illustrated that 
housing redevelopment had bandaged the aftermath of the Blitz. Along these lines, the Festival 
encouraged a “national spring-cleaning, for planting window boxes, flower baskets and 
temporary gardens, for painting the street lamps, decorating the streets and floodlighting 
buildings.”144 Victorian tenements faced the wrecking ball, and in their place would arise fresh 
housing projects and sleek apartment complexes. The 24,000 square feet of the Homes and 
Gardens Pavilion made this clear, filling the exhibition with blueprints and model rooms of 
contemporary yet comfortable dwellings in New Britain.145 Featuring bedrooms and playrooms 
for children, a farmer’s workshop, a lady’s garden, eight parlor configurations, and revolutionary 
strategies for maximizing spatial efficiency in the kitchen, Homes and Gardens projected that the 
government had fulfilled wartime expectations for better housing.146 It brought the family 
together again, exhibiting rooms for all members of the household no longer separated or 
distracted by the war effort. Homes and Gardens marked a nationwide revival that benefited all, 
highlighting the egalitarian nature of reconstruction, in which 
Houses, cottages and clubs have been built for old age pensioners. Playing fields and 
sporting grounds have been made or improved. There are places where 1951 will see laid 
the foundation stone of the new Town Hall or where a new park will be opened for the 
first time. Buildings of historical importance or architectural beauty have been restored… 
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Parish councils have provided seats for the village green or by the bus stops, they have 
improved the public lighting or the children’s playground, repaired footpaths or the gates 
and fences in the recreation ground, gardens have been planted, avenues of trees, or rose 
trees in the church yard.147 
 
Redevelopment in housing and town planning accounted for the family, children, the elderly, and 
even those who cherished the remaining traces of medieval British architecture. New Britain 
razed the physical remnants of the Blitz, preserved beloved, historical sites, and rejuvenated 
provincial and urban landscapes to increase living standards for residents and reunited families.  
 Reconstruction, the Festival showed, was a spectacle. Visitors to London could witness 
the full renovation of Poplar, an east end area severely damaged by the Blitz. This “live” 
architectural exhibition consisted of a model town in the process of being built, whose homes 
would be put on the market after the Festival.148 Poplar was the epitome of the Festival’s 
“cleaning-up scheme,” exhibiting “the best that current British architecture, town planning, and 
building technique have to offer,” an answer to the postwar housing crisis.149 Hopes for 
improved living standards were answered with slum clearance and the increasing availability of 
homes for a new generation of Britons. For what visitors saw in Poplar was an example of “the 
future London which is to arise from blitzed ruins and from the slums and chaotic planning of 
the past.”150 In this sense, Poplar shared a new standard for accommodation, offering a model for 
redevelopment and expectations.  
As such, Festival guides highlighted other areas being repaired from the Blitz. The 
“derelict and bomb-scarred wilderness” of Lansbury, for instance, had been transformed into “a 
new urban landscape in which the buildings are growing together as a community.”151 In 
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Liverpool, town planning had become ceremonial, where there occurred a “procession…on the 
last evening of the Festival…crowned by the chimes of midnight. As the bells ring out over the 
city and the river, giant bulldozers will make their first assault upon a section of Liverpool’s 
central blitzed area, giving reality to the ceremony’s theme: ‘Resurgence’ and declaring the 
city’s faith in the future.”152 Reconstruction was a nationwide success that united Britons and 
helped to erase the imprint of the Blitz. 
 Next came two pavilions on education and health. Here, “The New Schools” exhibited 
the revamping of nurseries, primary and secondary schools, and universities through displays of 
new school supplies and “specialist equipment for laboratories, craftrooms and workshops.”153 
Equal opportunities in education, the pavilion showed, had enabled the development of better 
schools, where students received more care in updated, modern learning environments. Such was 
the underlying theme in the health pavilion as well, which stressed that socialized healthcare still 
recognized “the importance of the individual in the community…for Britain leads the world in 
the individual attention given to the sick.”154 Although the welfare state now provided healthcare 
to all citizens, Britain continued to pride itself on maintaining patients’ privacy and attending to 
their needs on a one-to-one basis. The pavilion also portrayed how healthcare reform had 
modernized medicine. Items on display included a “modern electric apparatus for psychological 
experiments,” a “sluice control gear for catchment areas,” and “mass radiography equipment.”155 
These novel instruments represented innovation in British medicine, and showed how reform had 
benefited all Britons after the war.  
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 The architecture of the South Bank Exhibition also reflected the arrival of New Britain, a 
society founded on modern aesthetics and appearances. No longer was “everyday life… drab and 
grey,” but fashionable and sleek.156 Indeed, the construction of all pavilions utilized “modern” 
materials like steel, concrete, asbestos, glass, and aluminum.157 Alongside the monstrous Dome 
of Discovery, constructed with these materials, stood impressive structures like the Shot Tower 
and the Skylon, the former deemed a “London landmark.”158 Although constructed in 1826 using 
brick, the Festival Council saw it converted into a radio tower, with an antenna placed on top 
thirty-foot in diameter.159 This transformation, then, reflected a Festival initiative to repurpose 
old buildings for modern purposes. The Skylon, moreover, was a needle-like, steel structure 
suspended in the air at nearly three-hundred-feet high.160 Although visitors could not do anything 
but simply look at the Skylon, one ten-year-old boy commented that it was the best part of the 
South Bank. Similar to Betty Dark’s bewilderment with her steak, the boy stated, “The only 
thing I did like was the Skylon… I’ve never seen anything so nice in all my life.”161 These key 
features of the South Bank Exhibition thus conveyed that modernity had renovated the dreary 
and monotonous appearance of prewar Britain in favor of a more sophisticated, stylish, and 
stimulating update. Hugh Casson, the director of architecture at the site, found that the South 
Bank had been transformed into “a new world.”162 
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 All the same, this new world existed only within the twenty-seven acres of the South 
Bank Exhibition and in its periphery displays. Although reconstruction had opened more 
employment opportunities, had orchestrated housing redevelopment, and had brought education, 
healthcare, and aesthetic reform, the portrayal of postwar Britain on the South Bank exaggerated 
the successes of the Labour government with national recovery. Reconstruction was not a 
glamorous process complete with steaks and Skylons. As such, the South Bank failed to convey 
the difficulties Britons had faced following the Second World War under austerity, in an attempt 
to show how wartime expectations and hopes for New Britain had been satisfied with relative 
ease. Here, an underlying purpose of the Festival as a whole was to demonstrate how socialist 
reconstruction had produced the better, egalitarian future envisioned during the war, in order to 
generate hope for the nation’s future. In its overreach, the South Bank Exhibition remained an 
unconvincing representation of the postwar nation and “like all great fêtes in history…it solved 
nothing, but, for a brief, fleeting moment, it presented a mirage of hope.”163 Reconstruction 
brought division and disillusionment with wartime hopes and expectations, and not a united faith 
in the future 
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PART II 
Confronting Reality in Postwar Britain 
While the 1945 General Election slated the Labour Party as the emissary to deliver this 
comfortable, congruous future, austerity measures lasted well into the late 1940s and early 1950. 
Meager rations of meat, bread, clothing, and fuel, unemployment, taxes, and the looming costs of 
reconstruction drained faith for an egalitarian recovery. Although Let Us Face the Future, the 
Labour programme that announced the purpose and aspirations of the party if elected into the 
majority, outlined that “the Labour Party makes no baseless promises. The future will not be 
easy” and that “socialism cannot come overnight, as the product of a week-end revolution,” 
unachievable ideals of wartime planning nevertheless contributed to the party’s overwhelming 
victory.164 Geoffrey Field connects this unprecedented shift in the direction of domestic politics 
to a wartime “intensification of patriotism [that] coincided with a growing assertion of working-
class identity and solidarity,” what he calls “popular, left-wing ‘social patriotism.’”165 Austerity, 
however, posed familiar challenges to the lower classes, and provided a platform upon which to 
react and showcase discontentment. The postwar “plan which will win the Peace for the People” 
(or perceived lack thereof) deflated support for Labour and lessened faith in the possibilities of 
reconstruction.166 
 Even so, the socialist government had installed widespread economic and social reforms 
by the time of the Festival of Britain. The immediate postwar years ushered in a series of 
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parliamentary acts passed under the Labour majority that sought to assure equal opportunity and 
gradually provide the remodeled, improved future that had energized the masses during the 
Second World War. The New Towns Act in 1946, later supported by the Town and Country 
Planning Act in 1947 and the Countryside Act in 1949, ensured an equitable reevaluation of land 
for living purposes, along with a redevelopment of suburban and rural areas that either had fallen 
into disrepair or had been damaged by German bombs.167 Nationalization of industries, from 
transportation and electricity to coal, gas, iron and steel, eliminated competition (in theory) and 
protected jobs for working class citizens.168 Finally, the National Insurance Act, National 
Assistance Act, and National Health Service Act, all established in 1946, founded the British 
welfare state by expanding social security and national insurance, and providing free medical 
care to the public and redistributing of doctors in twenty hospital groups throughout the 
nation.169 By the end of 1948, 97% of Britons were under the NHS.170 These reforms prompted 
Herbert Morrison to exclaim that “the government had achieved ‘the most extensive and 
significant legislative programme in the history of our great Parliament.’”171 Although Attlee 
faced momentous challenges during his premiership, like a fuel crisis in the winter of 1946-47, 
sterling crisis in the summer of 1947, decolonization in India in 1947, Burma and Palestine in 
1948, and the disastrous collapse of the East African groundnut scheme in early 1951, 
                                                          
167 Christopher John Bartlett, A History of Postwar Britain 1945-74 (London: Longman Group Limited, 
1977), 48-57. 
168 Ibid., 53. 
169 Ibid., 61-63. 
170 Ibid., 4. 
171 Herbert Morrison as quoted in Jarman, Socialism in Britain, 170. 
Nilsen 49 
 
 
Morrison’s conclusion betrays little hyperbole.172 From the top, it appeared that the socialists had 
put the future in order.  
 The Festival of Britain, then, was a celebration of the successes of the postwar 
government, a reminder that the promises that the socialists had made during the war had, after 
all, been fulfilled. New Britain had arrived and replaced the old, aristocratic order. The interwar 
years were nothing but a past, albeit haunting, memory of depression and Chamberlain’s 
naiveté.173 Achieving “cradle to grave security” and managing to “sugar the pill of 
nationalization” were causes to rejoice.174  Through the festival, British culture, too, would be 
accessible to the people. As Becky Conekin affirms, the event became Labour’s “social 
democratic project,” a chance to showcase postwar development and progress before the polls 
opened — despite repeated confirmations from Barry and Morrison that the Festival was 
apolitical.175 Nonetheless, although the government had achieved an astonishing volume of 
reforms, Bartlett reminds that “the really creative or innovatory period of the Attlee ministries 
came to an end in 1947. Thereafter there was some filling in of the details, but in the main they 
were preoccupied with running a nation and an empire in the conditions of a deepening cold war 
and of a hesitant British economic recovery.”176 Not even socialist reconstruction could subvert 
“the peacetime evils of unemployment, poverty, and malnutrition.”177 Here, the Festival of 
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Britain was an opportunity to speak to the masses, where disillusionment could be checked and 
class tensions quelled.  
 
Early Tests to New Britain: The October 1945 Dockers’ Strike and Postwar Unrest 
In early October 1945, workers from the London docklands launched a national strike in 
opposition to their static wages. Extending from the south to Liverpool and Glasgow, and 
touching other midland coastal regions, the strike challenged the credibility of Labour’s promises 
for postwar economic recovery and social reform — what had slated the party for victory in the 
election that previous summer. Mass Observation records that this “Dockers’ Strike” was the 
first significant strike which occurred in the postwar period due to its sheer scale, as the strike 
not only covered an impressive area but received widespread media coverage and public 
attention.178 While the fixedness of wages (which had not increased since 1937) undoubtedly 
triggered the retaliation, along with poor working conditions, the end of the Lend-Lease 
Agreement, and thus lessened opportunities for work, the Dockers’ Strike exhibited an almost 
instantaneous, working-class disillusionment with the ability to realize wartime hopes and 
expectations.179 This pessimism reflected the declining faith in the idea that an egalitarian nation 
could emerge from the ashes of world war. And so, even though the Dockers’ Strike resulted 
from predictable frustrations with an unrecovered economy, the strike exposed an age-old social 
fragmentation that the “collective” war effort failed to mask through a myth of classlessness. 
Without war, without the repression of this tension, the strike empowered a ruthless 
confrontation between unskilled laborers and their detractors that destabilized the peace and 
questioned the feasibility of Labour’s agenda in Austerity Britain.  
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 Personal testimonies collected by Mass Observation that October provide complexity to 
the disadvantages that dockworkers faced after victory. Supporters of the strike — whether 
docker, family member or unaffiliated, unskilled worker — were low income individuals who 
had minimum standards of living and wanted their financial burdens to be lifted in the frugal 
postwar environment. Here, the protest highlighted the inconsistency of pay between unskilled 
industries and general inequity when having to support a large family. M55D echoed what Mass 
Observation had found while comparing prewar and postwar wages, stating, “All the other trades 
got a war bonus, yet we didn’t. We’re getting the same rate as in 1937, and now with fewer boats 
coming in we’re being cut down in our wage packets and feeling the difference.”180 A sixty-year-
old docker shared this frustration, calling the strike “pathetic…we’ve only done so because ever 
since 1937 our demands have been consistently refused. During the war we’ve worked till 10 
o’clock Sundays included and there’s never a boat left at these docks without being properly 
loaded.”181 As the wartime economy decelerated, so did the intensity of trade at the docks that 
had provided workers with more opportunities for work rather than any true increase in pay. This 
fixedness (what a docker called “a slave standard of living”) impacted more than the individual 
worker, as wages also supported households and families.182 The wife of a docker, aged thirty-
three and with eight children, reflected, “The works’ very hard — nobody but a dockie’s wife 
knows how tired the men are after a day’s work. The most my chap’s earned is £7 a week, but on 
average it’s about £5, and when there’s no work the pool money is £3.42d a week, and what with 
the rent and food and clothing you can just about keep them clean and pay for the bit of food.”183 
This example suggests that uncertainty in the immediate postwar months about work opportunity 
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and salary promised no concrete foundation upon which a lower income household could ensure 
financial security. M60D asked, “What a heart, I ask you, has a man got to bring up a family, 
never knowing when he goes in to work if there’ll be any for him?”184 These grievances pushed 
workers to express their indignation in response to the unstable and unreliable working 
conditions at the docks. This turbulence, which the wartime economic boom had quelled, would 
expose a postwar fracture in class relations and therefore challenge the government’s attempts to 
deliver reconstruction and egalitarianism in postwar Britain. 
 Dissatisfaction with Labour emerged, however, regardless of social class. Either austerity 
had worsened the postwar economy, failing to produce low unemployment, adequate wages and 
industrial revival, or these measures had allowed the strike to occur, resulting in a loss of food 
products that immorally affected the nation during a period of strict rationing. While one upper-
class woman commented that she found the strike “disgraceful… the workers themselves are 
hampering the Labour government,” another stated, “it’s very unfair — the dockies have had 
more than their share this war. They’ve got a Labour government and then they do this. No, it’s 
very wrong.”185 Dockers received the blame for the government’s inability to initiate a successful 
and expedited reconstruction program. And yet, so too did Labour receive criticism on their 
inability to answer the strike while beginning necessary reforms to end austerity. As the dockers 
refused to work, war veterans were installed to unpack and reload ships at the London docks, 
making the incendiary Socialist Appeal declare, “What a disgrace it is that a Labour Government 
should force the troops to strike-break! The Labour Government understood that to give the 
dockers concessions would start a snowball running down a hill. The demands of the dockers can 
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only be met at the expense of the capitalists.”186 Labour, the Socialist Appeal often expressed, 
allied itself with the capitalists — the corporations, the manufacturers, the industrialists — who 
subjugated and exploited working-class Britain. That fall, faith had dwindled across the 
socioeconomic levels. 
Condemnation did not end here, as the strike kindled anxieties about the availability of 
food rations being imported. Although the Minister of Food, Sir Benjamin Smith, confirmed that 
the strike would not affect the food supply nor decrease allowances per individual or family, his 
reassurances were ignored.187 Those interviewed by Mass Observation correlated inactivity at the 
docks to the likelihood of diminishing stocks at the grocers or supermarkets. One young woman 
interviewed near Battersea Park affirmed, “It’s very selfish, I should say, making everyone suffer 
instead of waiting a bit longer…It’s the food is going to be the worry. It’s disgusting, when 
we’re so short of everything. I hope they’ll settle it soon.”188  Another voiced a similar thought, 
calling the strike “wickedness, downright wickedness; all the war getting more in one day than 
our boys got in one week, and they draw their three or four pounds a week just for walking about 
doing nothing. People can’t stand that, you know; not after six years of war — people are in a 
poor way of health and if we don’t get our bite of rations wherever shall we be?”189 Even though 
one working-class man stated that “if some of the public saw some of the stuff that had come in 
during the last three months they’d know we were all right for rations — loads [original 
emphasis] of meat” and the Socialist Appeal reported that the food left unpacked included dried 
eggs, bags of starch, and “meat frozen stiff as logs,” the primary reason to denounce the strike 
remained that dockers were unprincipled and mercenary, sacrificing the nation for a wage 
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increase.190  In reality, rising food prices did pose a threat to working-class livelihood; however, 
the malcontent which resulted from austerity, on both the left and right, originated from Labour 
policies which promised a progressive period of reconstruction. Displeasure with the strike 
revealed a vexation amongst the higher classes, with the government unable to appease the 
obnoxious and inconvenient tirades of the working class.  
Tensions continued to build in the press, which either backed the docker cause while 
blaming capitalist greed or propagated fears of rations being threatened, and the nation’s food 
supply. The October 12 edition of the Daily Express, for example, boasted a headline which 
proclaimed “Bacon for Troops Cut: Rations Menaced” in all capitals.191 Similar headlines came 
from the Daily Mail, one being “Forgotten Food Is Rotting in Two School Dumps,” that 
correlated the effects of the strike to innocent, middle-class children and families being forced to 
eat rotten food.192 The Labour government, moreover, supported these stories and officially 
denounced the strike, a signal that the party had begun “moving away from its working-class 
image. Attlee had been educated at Haileybury and Oxford — though he looked like Lenin and, 
as far as practical results went, was the best socialist of the lot.”193 Although Labour remained 
committed to socialist legislation throughout the late 1940s, strikes challenged its promises of 
progress and recovery. On the other hand, left-leaning papers like the Socialist Appeal berated 
the press for “misrepresenting the dockers’ case” and “whipping up public opinion against the 
dockers’ fight for a living wage.”194  One edition featured cartoons of Hitler as a trade union boss 
and Churchill, who the Socialist Appeal called a “baby starver,” as a manufacturer.195 And while 
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the dockers protested and refused to work under some conditions, nevertheless “dockers in every 
port have offered to unload perishable foodstuffs, cigarettes and Christmas parcels, Red Cross 
equipment, free and without receiving one penny for it.”196 This polarization and competition to 
monopolize the truth presented a broken and divided image of postwar Britain.  
Indeed, upper-class criticisms amounted to accusations of blackmail and tyranny. One 
housewife had a friend who “suggested it was a pity they couldn’t experience a strike of the 
public services [themselves]; have their electricity and gas and water turned off — then they’d 
have a little more understanding of what that sort of thing means — blackmailing the whole 
community.”197 Similarly, F30B stated that “everybody at the office was saying it was a pity that 
the gas and electricity and water supply couldn’t be cut off from the dockers’ homes; then they’d 
realize what a blackmailing weapon was. I don’t think they’ve got any public sympathy at all.”198 
The dockers, in this case, become traitors to the nation, an undisciplined, self-serving group that 
devalues and corrupts a hard-won victory and resulting peace. As another affirmed, “They’re 
making the whole country suffer. They’ve made good money out of the war…but no, it’s all 
gone on beer and cigarettes. No, I’m not in favour of them myself; a worthless good-for-nothing 
class of men, the lowest of the low, the scum of the earth. But maybe you’ll not get another to 
tell you so much of the truth.”199 While an extremity, this latter opinion paints the dockers and 
the working class as unpatriotic and even unhuman, like leeches that do nothing but drain Britain 
of its potential and purity. Together, these comments show a willingness to disassociate and 
detach from a lower class and its grievances. In threatening the nation, in being tyrants, the 
dockers were not representative nor deserving of a better, sophisticated, and modern Britain.  
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As such, the strike hindered the coming of New Britain. The strike exposed the 
unhappiness and exasperation of a fatigued working class and an uncompromising public, and 
the new norm of postwar austerity. Rationing was a national grievance, transformed into an 
anxiety when under threat. In this sense, the Dockers’ Strike revealed the fragility of postwar 
Britain, quite the contrary to an envisioned promised land of peace and prosperity. Britain 
continued to rely on American aid and imported basic necessities, challenging the proud 
independence of a nation who, four years previously, had faced Nazi Germany “alone.”200 
Wartime conditions had followed the people into peace and generated disillusionment and 
unrest. As Jarman observes, “In wartime a government can do things it cannot do in peacetime, 
and… in wartime people will work harder, accept burdens, and put up with rationing and 
controls.”201 The strike marked the continuity of class tensions, in which each pole discarded the 
other’s humanity and value to the nation. As one working-class man explained, “I’m not a dockie 
myself, but that’s what the trouble was. It seemed as if the men were forgotten.”202 Workers were 
essential parts of the war machine, yet invisible in the factories — parts appreciated if they ran 
well and did not break down. These class tensions thus cast ambiguity over a future that the 
government had planned and the people anticipated. As F35D commented, “Well, I can manage 
this week, but what bothers me is what’s going to happen next week?”203 Uncertainty about the 
future emerged after the peace, not a nationwide faith in egalitarian progress. 
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New Britain Assessed at the 1946 Britain Can Make It Exhibition 
September 1946. London’s Victoria & Albert Museum, a distinguished nucleus of world art and 
design, opened its doors to a new exhibition, narrowly entitled Britain Can Make It.204 
Sponsored by the Council of Industrial Design and built upon the labors of specialized sub-
committees on industry and manufacturing, the exhibition was a showcase of artisan goods and 
commodities that had yet to reach mass production lines for postwar consumers. Visitors entered 
the museum from Exhibition Road, and waited in a queue (which sometimes extended out onto 
Exhibition Road) before gaining access to the domestic wonderland. Once inside, the exhibition 
led visitors through a sequence of thirty-five themed rooms, ranging from furnished bathrooms 
and power appliances to packaging and designs of the future. That October, a Mass Observation 
report found that nine out of every ten people interviewed in “Britain” had heard of the 
exhibition in South Kensington, at least in the area between Portsmouth and Manchester. 33% of 
the sample had heard through newspapers, 25% through advertisement, and the remaining half 
through sources like the BBC or even the cinema.205 Why unleash a mass-marketing campaign 
for an exhibition on industrial design? What were the explicit and perhaps implicit rationales 
driving the Council of Industrial Design’s efforts to organize the exhibition?  
 The reported purpose of Britain Can Make It, as advertised by the Council of Industrial 
Design, was to affirm industrial continuity and potential in postwar Britain. Britain Can Make It 
was intended to offer evidence of postwar reconstruction’s successes and confirmation that the 
nation had emerged from the adversity of world war without having lost prewar industrial 
capability. As Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Council’s Board of Trade, put it in the 
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Council’s survey of the exhibition, Design ’46, “After the trials and dislocations of the greatest 
war in the world’s history, people are anxious to know how British industry has fared so far as 
concerns goods for civilian use… This exhibition gives the answer and shows that despite our 
losses we have not lost that tradition of good design which has made British industries famous in 
the past.”206  Cripps argues that Britain Can Make It not only proves the continuity of industrial 
leadership and economic stability in Britain after 1945, but that the exhibition marks the 
beginning of an advancement in British technology and design. The Chair of the Council, S.C. 
Leslie, echoed Cripps in his report in Design ‘46. The exhibition was, he noted, “an act of 
national policy of first class importance,” and “an opportunity of showing to the people at home 
and the world at large that Britain can make it…of advancing the cause of good design on all 
fronts at once.”207 While promoting the tradition of quality in design and craftsmanship, Britain 
Can Make It would celebrate the bulletproof forces behind British industry, both the machines 
and manpower, which brought the nation through the Second World War to the promising dawn 
of the postwar era.  
 Indeed, Britain Can Make It attempted to present the human behind the product, in this 
case the designer and the manufacturer, to forge a persuasive, meaningful bond between 
industrialist and consumer. This goal faltered. As visitors wandered through the exhibition, they 
contributed their opinions on the displayed products by ranking them based upon their efficiency, 
appearance, and material. Visitors’ responses were placed in slots called “quiz stalls,” where they 
would be judged in comparison to assessments made by what Mass Observation labeled 
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“experts” in product design. The exhibition gave agency to the consumer, where progress in 
industrial design depended on their evaluations on a product’s aesthetic and practicality. As the 
Britain Can Make It guide declared, “The manufacturer wants your opinion. If you ask for good 
designs, he will be at pains to provide them. The future of British design rests, in the long run, 
with you.”208 This message hardly resonated among the audience, unfortunately. Mass 
Observation reports, through interviews conducted on-site, that visitors were concerned with 
whether the product would aesthetically fit in their home or lifestyle, and little else. “There is, in 
other words, a strong desire amongst almost everybody to have in their ideal home what they 
have seen in the course of their visit. As will be later shown, far fewer expect that they will ever 
have these things, but none the less they are potential buyers within the limits of their 
pockets.”209 Visitors came to Britain Can Make It to be consumers, to idealize and to dream — 
not to admire manufacturing processes, technicalities of design, nor the craftsmen and 
industrialists behind the products on display. While the intended outcome behind the exhibition 
would have reflected an increased public appreciation for these operations and their engineers, 
along with a reassurance of postwar preeminence in industrial development, the Council of 
Industrial Design and the V&A Museum merely endorsed a ceremonial opportunity for window 
shopping. 
 Just as the exhibition propagated unachievable ideals in home decor and lifestyle goods, 
Britain Can Make It presented an all too rosy portrait of consumers in postwar Britain, and their 
dwelling spaces — an image exemplified by the catalogue of products in the furnished rooms. 
For instance, while rooms were decorated within the means of the occupant’s purchasing power, 
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they exhibited idealized images of each social class and their living spaces. Here, the most 
popular and highly praised room was “the kitchen of a cottage of a modern mining village,” 
designed by Edna Mosely.210 On display were white glazed wall tiles, inlaid linoleum, a metal 
window, gas-heated wash boiler, gas refrigerator and gas cooker, among other goods that 
signified a comfortable and kitsch, working-class home environment. This differed considerably 
from the presentation of “a kitchen with dining recess in a small modern house,” designed by 
Frederick MacManus.211 Instead of gas appliances, this kitchen boasted an electric refrigerator, 
electric cooker, and an electric space heater, complemented by a porcelain steel sink and drainer, 
wooden windows, “Sutherland Rose” curtains, and hand-printed wallpaper, “single print white 
star on grey ground, traditional Victorian design.”212 This was only the beginning, as the 
exhibition had on display a third “kitchen in a large, well-appointed house.”213 And even more 
revealing of socioeconomic contrasts were the bathrooms on display. H. Taylor and David Green 
adorned their middle-class bathroom with plastic sheeting on the walls and door, linoleum, 
fluorescent lighting, a toilet with a black plastic seat (product name “Comfort”), and an 
aluminum window.214  On the contrary, “a luxury bathroom” contained “bronze-sprayed, sand-
blasted, fluted” glass, a white terrazzo floor, a porcelain bath, a “chromium-plated, pedestal 
lavatory basin,” a white bidet, and two lamps mounted on the wall, labeled “Electric Sun.”215 
The discrepancies between social classes could not have been more obvious or intentional within 
the furnished rooms, then, as Britain Can Make It categorized each room and its affiliated 
products by quality in relation to the expected occupant’s socioeconomic status.  
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 The exhibition, however, never painted these differences as divisions, per se, but rather as 
necessary, functional parts which made up a harmonious whole, the nation. Although the Council 
of Industrial Design developed and showcased these model rooms for occupants based on their 
socioeconomic status, the exhibition would nevertheless contribute to a false understanding of 
contentment within and between social classes in postwar Britain. The Britain Can Make It 
Exhibition Catalogue demonstrated this problematic approach by including illustrations of the 
people who would live in these spaces — families, couples or single occupants next to the lists of 
products in each furnished room. The familial paragon of the mining village kitchen featured a 
family composed of the “coal miner, middle aged, active trade unionist, member of colliery 
choir. His wife, a member of Women’s Institute; their three children.”216 The wife sits on an old 
chair cradling a baby, while the father admires his eldest son, not quite a teenager, who makes 
funny faces at the baby. His younger sister holds onto her father’s waistband while reaching 
down to pet a black kitten pawing at her leg. Husband and wife are smiling. All members are 
modestly dressed, with the wife wearing an apron. The catalogue follows — and perhaps 
unintentionally contrasts — this idealized working-class family, in their quaint, adequate life 
with the family found within “a kitchen in a large, well-appointed house,” designed by Maxwell 
Fry and Jane Drew.217  Here the catalogue presented the “managing director of an engineering 
works; university education. His wife; lived in America for some years. Their daughter, now at 
boarding school. Their staff; two maids and a manservant.”218 A little black poodle wags its tail 
in front of the crowd, the butler hands the patriarch a telephone, and his wife converses with a 
maid, wearing an elaborate hat. In the background hangs a portrait with a gilded frame that 
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matches an elegant table resting beneath. Other furnished rooms showcase similarly satisfied 
Britons. The “kitchen within dining recess in a small, modern house” features an architect, his 
wife, and son.219  The “bedroom in a small house in an industrial town” features the family of a 
railway engineer and ex-soldier, the housewife and their five children.220 Urban environments 
generally promote singles or young couples living in townhouses or flats. Most importantly, each 
illustration depicts the occupant(s) as content, happy in their own environment and undisturbed 
by financial disparities. Together, these quintessential Britons form the postwar nation, a place of 
cooperation and consonance.  
 All the same, the location and idea of consumption behind Britain Can Make It limited 
the extent to which the exhibition represented an egalitarian Britain. First, it was restrictive in 
being held at the V&A. While nine out of ten Britons had heard of the exhibition, Mass 
Observation concludes that approximately two out of five attendees lived in London, with a 
quarter more visitors coming from within 25 miles of the city.221 Thus, “attendance falls steadily 
with distance especially among the less well off.”222 Those who could afford travel costs, or who 
were already planning a trip to London, were able to see the exhibition, while those who did not 
have the budget for long-distance travel or the luxury of holidays did not. Moreover, Mass 
Observation states that visitors had more interest in idealizing the displayed products in their 
own homes or lifestyles than learning about the process of industrial design and manufacturing, 
let alone paying appreciation to the manufacturers and craftsmen themselves. “What most people 
want to see in the Exhibition,” the report reveals, “tallies closely with what they most want to 
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buy… despite general knowledge that the items are not for sale.”223 Attending the exhibition 
with the sole intention of buying suggests that a majority of visitors had money to spend or, if 
they did not, fantasized about a life that they did not have. In this sense, although the exhibition 
displayed varying qualities of products that acknowledged a range of what visitors could afford, 
it created a distinction between those who did and those who did not have the luxury to purchase 
new items. Britain Can Make It seemingly became an exhibition for a group of people who could 
afford to indulge in their aesthetic desires and in modern living.  
Despite these poignant admissions of a class structure, an idyllic social harmony 
sweetened Britain Can Make It and cast postwar Britain as progressive and egalitarian. S.C. 
Leslie, Director of the Council of Industrial Design, exclaimed in Design ’46: 
Eighteenth-century society...was aristocratic while ours is to an increasing extent 
democratic…Today, the manufacturer and designer are confronted by what Mr. Churchill 
once called the rich variety of our island life (to say nothing of the even more varied 
tastes and needs of an Empire and world.) Never was demand more widely effective than 
in a society like ours today — never did so many different social and economic groups 
constitute a market for the designer and his products.224  
 
Industrial innovation and the ability to purchase modern products and new fashions was a 
postwar reality for all, Leslie suggests, regardless of social class. Here, an egalitarian 
consumerism formed a very real present enabled by workers in industrial design and in industry 
itself. Christian Barman, on the subcommittee for transportation, followed this logic in 
Design ’46 as well. 
To understand this quality [in British transport], it is necessary to consider its relation to 
the modern development of social equality in Great Britain. Social equality is far from 
being an exclusive possession of the British; indeed, its presence is probably more 
conspicuous in some of the smaller democracies of Western Europe than it is in the 
British Isles. What is peculiar to Great Britain is not so much the fact of equality as the 
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common desire of the British people to achieve as quickly as possible equality for all at 
the highest level of physical well being. This physical well-being is seen not as a reward 
for exception-al exertions but as the rightful possession of all citizens.225  
 
Barman continues, acknowledging the progress that domestic transport has made to establish 
travel as unrestrictive and affordable for lower socioeconomic classes. Small cars and minimized 
differences between first and second-class railway compartments (which Barman notes “are so 
nearly similar that foreigners often cannot tell the one from the other until the trifling differences 
have been pointed out to them”) are evidence that postwar Britain is a progressive Britain, in 
which class boundaries need not structure the output and offerings of industry.226 Moreover, this 
movement is a signature of liberal democracy, which naturally promises equality not only in the 
market, but in regards to the welfare of its citizens. Britain Can Make It, then, framed the 
postwar nation as a pure democracy, as a nation that valiantly battled through world war, 
retained its industrial competency and prestige, and emerged more progressive, more eager to 
fight for the well-being and betterment of all Britons — at least as consumers. Leslie and 
Barman showed that, while socioeconomic groups may have existed, postwar British industry 
had pursued an agenda of egalitarianism and balanced welfare. Classes were merely functional 
identities, and were not representative of division. Postwar industry provides equal opportunity 
to all consumers, whose respective classes constituted the diverse and amicable fabric of the 
nation.  
 Britain Can Make It thus pitched modernity in British industry as a phenomenon 
accessible to all income-levels. Were visitors to the exhibition convinced by the postwar Britain 
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that the V&A had on display? Even though Mass Observation concludes that visitors used 
“modernity” to praise products and new designs, whereas “old-fashioned” became a form of 
criticism, the exhibition persuaded few that they would actually obtain these goods in the near 
future.227 As the wife of an engineer commented, “I am a bit disappointed that we can’t buy 
some of these things now [original emphasis]. It’s one thing knowing that Britain Can Make It 
but what I want to know is when can Britain get it.”228 This impatience to buy, as described 
above, undervalued the intended purpose of the exhibition. Furthermore, a disbelief in the 
present indicated reflects growing pessimism in Austerity Britain. Mass Observation notes that 
while visitors praised plastic and aluminum products (“plastic curtains are touched by almost 
everyone passing them”), glassware products were considered “exotic and unattainable.”229 
Several visitors even found the displays to illustrate a lack of progress in design. One stated that 
while he found the exhibition “exceptionally good… there is nothing standing-out about it, most 
of the designs were foreseen by us in the pre-war days.”230 Another expressed, “Lots of things 
here are no different to what they were before the war. The furniture wasn’t any good really, I 
wouldn’t like furniture like it.”231  
And yet, the exhibition received generally positive reviews from those leaving, despite 
the criticism overheard or the fatigue visitors showed upon exiting the museum. Four out of five 
people, Mass Observation affirms, enjoyed themselves. One housewife, whose husband’s 
profession was a dustman, recalled, “All of it, it was all interesting, that’s what I say. It ain’t 
often you come across a place where you’re interested in everything but this Exhibition caters for 
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everyone.”232 For the majority, modernity sold. Even if visitors criticized the unavailability of the 
products, newness did make an impression. 95% of those leaving the exhibition confirmed that 
they wanted something within Britain Can Make It.233 Visitors may not have fully believed in the 
Britain on display; however, they sought that same future. 
 Although the advertised purpose of the Britain Can Make It exhibition was to host a 
public confirmation of postwar industrial recovery, while celebrating the manpower and 
craftsmanship behind the machine, the Council of Industrial Design and visitors had ulterior 
motives. Britain Can Make It cultivated the idea of a postwar nation free from social strife and 
conflict. The exhibition welcomed visitors to an egalitarian Britain where classes existed as mere 
indications of social purpose, to a New Britain where industry supposedly supplied all citizens 
with equal opportunities to consume newness and the latest fashions and models for the 
consumer’s home environment and lifestyle. Consequently, visitors were mostly receptive to the 
Britain on offer. Britain Can Make It became a golden chance to entertain wartime ideals. The 
Council of Industrial Design sold postwar industry as a buttress of an egalitarian utopia where “a 
community of people with advanced social standards, eminent commonsense, their own brand of 
humane cheerfulness, and a marked instinct for comfort can—it is agreed—be a political portent 
and beacon.”234 In this new society, modernity was not a luxury that only those with financial 
reserves could afford. The exhibition maintained that all interested buyers could enjoy newness. 
If upper-class consumers wanted a white bidet, a white bidet they would have. If working-class 
consumers wanted a plastic toilet seat, a plastic toilet seat they would have. These rosy 
assumptions did not reflect the reality outside the exhibition. 
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Paradise Lost: The 1947 Battle for Output and Postwar Economic Crises 
Early 1947 suggested that Britain may never “get it” — plastic toilet seats and all. The winter 
following the Britain Can Make It exhibition, the nation entered a crippling fuel crisis that 
resulted from labor and equipment shortages in the coalmines. This accompanied insufficient 
exports, a marginally reduced unemployment rate, budget cuts in housing programs, and a 
noticeable lack of improvement in living standards. As The Times found, although the 
government placed emphasis on the need for a higher quantity of goods and services leaving 
Britain, exports “still failed by £200,000,000 to pay for a volume of imports no more than 70 per 
cent of 1938.”235 These reality checks contrasted from the optimistic economic evaluations that 
comprised the 1947 white paper, a fifty-page booklet issued by the Labour government on the 
state of the economy and the year’s industrial objectives. Entitled The Battle for Output, the 
booklet called for an expansion of “the nation’s labor force, to increase its output, and to insure 
the placement of labor in the most useful jobs.”236 Britain, the white paper revealed, was not on 
track to achieving its full industrial potential with maximum efficiency.  
Not only had this decline in production prevented living standards from increasing in 
1945 and 1946, but the lack of output threatened the nation’s long held influence, prominence, 
and reputation in Commonwealth markets. Workers needed to produce higher quantities of 
output on an individual level while efforts were underway by the government, trade unions, and 
employment agencies to resolve labor shortages in major industries like textiles, agriculture, and 
coal mining. As Bernard Wall said in his essay Britain and the Crisis (1948), the government 
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had failed to warn the public of “a new period of ‘sweat and tears’” following the war.237 An 
inability to appease discontent continued to kindle a culture of pessimism, with downcast hopes 
and feelings of helplessness, well into the late 1940s and during the twilight of the Labour 
government. Moreover, the aspiration for egalitarianism in the postwar era had long departed. 
The production crisis, the government argued, resulted from working-class inactivity. This 
alienation resulted in a fracture between Labour’s working-class image and workers themselves. 
A familiar socioeconomic division had emerged between the political establishment and 
disillusioned worker.   
 The worker controlled whether output increased, the white paper asserted. It raised 
“alarm over the inflationary trends and…stressed that primary and overriding consideration must 
be given to maximizing output and steadying costs, if Britain was to regain her international 
solvency.”238  Here, The Battle for Output was a plea for productivity in place of leisure. As a 
Mass Observation report on the white paper added, “In democracy, apathy is every bit as 
dangerous as antagonism.”239  Because only workers had the means to bolster production, the 
crisis was nothing but a result of their inefficiency, sluggishness, or even mercenary motivations. 
The white paper cast blame on workers for slow industrial recovery and imposed rigid 
expectations on the energy and time spent doing work. “Britain cannot afford the luxury of 
shorter hours,” it stated, “unless it can be shown that total output will not suffer.”240 As such, the 
survey bound workers to factory, farm, and mine.  
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A transportation strike that January, in the midst of the fuel crisis, confirmed this scorn as 
common sentiment — one that paralleled opinions expressed during the October 1945 dockers’ 
strike. One middle-class woman exclaimed that the strike was “just terrible. Very selfish — don’t 
know what the country is coming to. Nobody works hard. People [are] ignorant. Terrible to think 
of all the food wasted.”241 A middle-class chemist said that he felt “slightly offended” that the 
strike had occurred, jeopardizing the livelihoods of all Britons.242 Wall also criticized public 
inactivity as a trigger of the production crisis. “Is it [the crisis] a result,” he asked, “of…those 
now characteristic street scenes in British cities? So that, whereas public spokesmen urge that 
production must be increased far above the prewar level if Britain is to get out of the morass, in 
fact one sees immense crowds mooning up and down shop windows or queueing at cinema 
entrances or occupying every bench in the park?”243 The civilian, then, who could be working, 
had full responsibility in ensuring the success of schemes for national recovery. For higher 
standards of living and the reassertion of prewar and wartime influence, achieving export 
objectives was imperative, rather than taking the time for an afternoon pint or a trip to the 
cinema.  
 Motivations to work and support the reconstruction programme, however, faltered as a 
result of austerity. An Australian pamphlet distributed to ameliorate postwar prosperity in the 
Commonwealth expressed an urgency to increase morale through the availability of food. 
Entitled Food for Britain, the pamphlet described how food rationing created “dangerous 
psychological effects on the British people and their ability to maintain ancient and accustomed 
place of influence and leadership in the world.”244 Australia was responsible for aiding “the 
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British people [who] are waging a desperate battle for economic survival on empty stomachs.”245 
Once again, the empire buttressed British resilience in the fight for world influence and 
prosperity. Yet domestic producers in Britain acknowledged the necessity of providing an 
adequate agricultural supply as well. In November of 1949, Sir James Turner, the President of 
the National Famers’ Union, addressed a meeting of agricultural laborers congregated for the 
first lecture of a series called The Battle for Food. He stated, “Food production and procurement 
are the first and most essential social factors in the life of any community and are, in addition, 
the actual foundations of economic security for an industrial community such as ours.”246 
Although domestic farming had actually seen an increase in mechanization, productivity, and 
output since 1945, available crops constituted what Food for Britain labeled a “grimly 
monotonous, distressingly plain” diet “lacking in those nutritional qualities necessary to the 
highest standards of physical and mental fitness.”247 Grains and vegetables native to British soils 
formed the postwar palette, with a noticeable lack of meat and dairy products. This poor 
variation and range of food provided little support for a demanding workweek, let alone an 
optimistic attitude for the present. And low morale resulted from more than nutritional 
limitations. In contrast to the sparkling displays put on by Britain Can Make It, “the case of 
clothing and household goods” presented another grim reality in which “manufacturers were 
directed to produce supplies of low-cost, plain utility goods, at the expense of more luxurious 
items.”248 Austerity, experienced through a production crisis and accompanying fuel shortage, 
presented an austere and harsh New Britain without much warmth indeed.  
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 The winter of 1946-47 solidified this image. As fuel became a scarce resource, “the 
British froze in their homes and offices, factories went on short time, no outdoor display lighting 
was allowed, and precious dollars were spent on imports of coal — with a 200 years’ supply 
waiting to be mined.”249 The number of Britons willing to forsake light for work in the mines had 
decreased since the start of the war, and returning soldiers had little motivation to disappear once 
more and enter the mines. While the Labour government planned to resolve the consequent labor 
shortage by workers from Poland and Eastern Europe, Britain in the meantime suffered. With 
one million persons were out of work, the crisis represented the arduous and lethargic recovery at 
hand. This, and Britain’s “whole prosperity,” Dudley Stamp believed, “depends essentially on 
her ability to obtain coal that still exists in quantity in her coal fields.”250 With the fate of the 
nation at stake, “the fuel crisis…reinforced the urgency of these pleas [of the 1947 white paper] 
for larger production at lower cost.”251  Even if the National Coal Board, established in the 
summer of 1946 by the Coal Nationalization Bill, had planned to bolster the coal industry with 
improved equipment and restructure inter-industrial hierarchies, initial efforts had not revived 
production to maximize efficiency and exports.252 Between 1939 and 1946, output per miner had 
fallen from 1.17 tons to 1.05 tons, affecting total output by nearly fifty tons (total output in 1939 
was 301.9 tons).253  These numbers bettered, however, by the fall of 1948 when employment 
reached 19.2 million persons and total output for the economy in general increased by 27% from 
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the 1946 average.254  Nevertheless, from the the fall of 1946 into 1947, reconstruction appeared 
to stagnate and the better world remained unforeseeable. 
 In this sense, the concept of planning itself experienced considerable backlash during this 
period. Conservatives associated the term with the inefficiency of bureaucracy and failure of the 
Labour government to initiate reform quick enough to lift austerity measures, a criticism adopted 
by civilians as well. Turner denounced “utopian planners” in his 1949 speech and their naiveté in 
response to economic crises, due to their lacking “an acute sense of urgency.”255 Because 
planning had failed to bring recovery into immediate effect, because the absence of improved 
standards of living then generated discontent and frustration, a skepticism and distrust of political 
schemes emerged. As The Times affirmed, “Even the experience of the past twenty months, so 
fully set out in this very document [The Battle for Output], has not yet convinced Mr. Attlee and 
his colleagues that the only possible foundation for planning is to prepare for the worst.”256 A 
Mr. T.C. Norris of the National Farmers’ Union encapsulated this sentiment after Turner’s 
speech, voicing concern over Britain prioritizing reconstruction in the colonies over domestic 
recovery. He states 
We should invest primarily in our own home country, for with money expanded on these 
Homelands they could have their capacity for production considerably exhausted. When 
we observe that our Government has just expended some £29 million in a fantastic 
scheme for growing groundnuts in Africa and realize in the end we may lose it all, if Mr. 
Malan carries out his ideas of making Africa independent of the British Commonwealth, 
it illustrates… the disadvantages of expending capital abroad at a time when our 
homeland is crying out for it.257 
 
The failure of the African groundnuts scheme in 1951 was the epitaph on planning’s 
grave. While the losses of India, Palestine, Burma, and Ceylon by the eve of the Festival of 
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Britain discouraged Britain from believing in an easy return to world power status, 
decolonization also marked the loss of the nation’s great scheme – the British Empire.258 Little 
wonder, then, why the Festival Committee devoted one exhibit to the Commonwealth that 
summer, isolated from the South Bank and Battersea sites in the old Imperial Institute, located 
beyond the western edge of Hyde Park.259 Planning had seemingly reached exhaustion. 
 Therefore, the immediate postwar years presented challenges to the popularity of the 
Labour government and produced an increasing need for the Festival of Britain. The Battle for 
Output was a confirmation of the deprivation and stagnation that Britain faced despite successes 
like the nationalization of industries and the establishment of the welfare state. Continuous 
shortages and economic crises, moreover, offered a poor ground upon which to reduce 
dissatisfaction. Without fuel, without a satisfying palette, and without much hope for the 
implementation of wartime hopes, Britain momentarily sputtered. The egalitarian society that 
members of the public had longed for had not fully materialized, and the New Britain that had 
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motivated the war effort contained little of the socioeconomic congruity expected. What Britain 
wanted, it could not get.  
 
A Pacification of the Nation: Social Cohesion on the South Bank 
When Hugh Casson, the Festival’s director of architecture, remarked that he had seen the South 
Bank transformed into “a new world,” he specified who the public owed for this makeover. 
“Now first of all,” he states, “I want to make it clear that to mount an exhibition of this size is a 
team job, in which many hundreds of people are concerned. Architects, and engineers, and 
technicians and building workers in all trades, script-writers and sculptors and typists, and lorry 
drivers and scientists and painters and canteen cooks and gardeners and clerks…they have 
managed to transform…27 acres of dilapidated wharves and derelict housing, for generations a 
disgrace to London” into the main, shimmering attraction of the Festival.260 To the workers, 
Casson gave recognition. The Festival of Britain was, after all, the product of a collective effort.  
 The South Bank Exhibition’s exaggeration of reconstruction’s success enabled the 
Festival Council to paint a glowing portrait of the workers who had contributed to “national 
revival.” While displays throughout the exhibition highlighted famed contributors to the 
advancement of British “civilization,” they also stressed the work that ordinary Britons 
continued to do to support the nation as a whole.261 Downstream circuit pavilions celebrated the 
works of Shakespeare and Beatrix Potter, honored Florence Nightingale’s efforts to reform 
nursing, and revered deceased cricket stars, just as upstream circuit pavilions praised James 
Watt’s steam engine, Sir Charles Parsons’ turbo-electric motors, and Thomas Edmonson’s 
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invention of the railway ticket “to remember the past and to honour the work of men and 
women…whose genius and enterprise has given us something to record and celebrate in 
1951.”262 This elite, however, did not represent the everyday labors and toils of Britain’s 
working class. As Orwell declared in The Lion and the Unicorn, “The heirs of Nelson and 
Cromwell are not in the House of Lords. They are in the fields and the streets, in the factories 
and the armed forces, in the four-ale bar and the suburban back garden.”263 In paying tribute to 
citizens who had participated (albeit, perhaps unwillingly) in reconstruction efforts, the South 
Bank Exhibition sought to pacify the discontent that had emerged from those who most felt the 
effects of prolonged austerity. These appeasement attempts were often painfully contrived, and 
offered an all-too auspicious narrative of social harmony that sharply diverged from the austerity 
experience.  
 Although the Festival Council encouraged local governments to prepare and clean-up 
their towns for “hundreds of thousands of guests from overseas,” the celebration was not for the 
tourists.264 The council encouraged local authorities to adopt “modest plans for new building, the 
renovation of existing buildings, clearing and layout of bombed sites, the provision of a new park 
or street furniture…and so on,” but with the ultimate intention of using the Festival to benefit 
permanent, local residents.265 Even if these schemes impressed tourists and rendered superior 
images of British living standards, improvements made before and during 1951 served to 
advantage citizens first. Unlike the Festival of Britain, “the 1851 Exhibition was international 
and unselected; 1951 will be entirely British and will show nothing that does not do this 
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country…the highest degree of credit.”266 The Festival wanted to show that reconstruction was 
for the welfare of Britons, a process “in which… every citizen can share.”267 New Britain was for 
New Britons. 
 According to the Festival, New Britons worked for the benefit of all citizens, especially 
in their combined efforts to recover from the war. Moreover, this national spirit to undertake 
mutually beneficial labor now characterized a new Britishness. Here, “the clatter of clogs in the 
Lancashire mill towns, the to-and-fro of the lorries on the Great Northern Road, the queues 
outside the Labour Exchanges, the rattle of pin-tables in the Soho pubs, the old maids biking to 
Holy Communion through the mists of the autumn mornings” became symbols of modern British 
life.268 Everyday labor and ordinary Britons, the Festival showed, were just as valuable to the 
nation as the great inventors and praised cultural figures. All chipped in to support others. With 
this mindset, the Festival sought to tell “the story of ourselves, of how we live and of how our 
way of life is served by those who design and make instruments of that living.”269 Like Casson, 
the Festival sought to give recognition to the average worker who propped up British society, 
who made it function so that others could contribute to it in different ways. “Other 
demonstrations here and abroad,” a guide stated, “have shown a country’s art, its industries, and 
its institutions, but none has tried like this to recreate a people’s personality from birth to 
maturity. This we shall not do by abstractions, but by letting the work of British men and 
                                                          
266 Festival of Britain Office and the Council of Industrial Design, Notes for Industry on the 1951 
Exhibition: Summary of Industrial Exhibits, Method of Collection, Instructions for Submitting Products to 
the 1951 Stock List (London: Fosh and Cross Ltd, 1951), 2-3. 
267 Festival of Britain Office, The Festival of Britain 1951, 3. 
268 Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn, 11. 
269 Festival of Britain Office, The Festival of Britain 1951, 9. 
Nilsen 77 
 
 
women, past and present, give evidence of their belief and purpose.”270 New Britons had an 
egalitarian work ethic that constructed the national character. 
 The craftsman, the South Bank affirmed, represented a wholesome, British dedication to 
skilled work, an unassuming form of labor that industrialization could not replace. In the 
upstream circuit, the craftsman featured in the third pavilion on life in the countryside. “Creating 
the fabric for this varied life, the country craftsman is at work. Much of the modern setting is of 
his deserving; his are those many properties of the country scene that we take so easily for 
granted – the hedges and the hurdles, the thatch of cottages and barns, the walls, the harness of 
horses and baskets that go to market.”271 In this sense, the pavilion associated the craftsman with 
a romanticized, British countryside. Kitsch imagery formed both the presentation of rural 
landscapes and villages, and the craftsman’s work ethic. “There is a rare quality… in the motions 
of the craftsman; to watch him is to see a work of art performed. His tools seem like a living 
prolongation of his hands; his touch responds to the variation in the material he is working. We 
are proud of these men; they are basic to our way of life, of which machines will never quite take 
charge.”272 Highlighting the work of craftsmen through displays on pottery, ceramics, cutlery, 
glass blowing, and the process of making paper, the pavilion paid respect to the humble 
profession while affirming its irrevocable place in British culture.  
 So too did “The Country” pavilion praise farmers, who nourished the nation through the 
cultivation of the land and embodied the increased wealth brought by rural industrial 
development and mechanization in agriculture. “It is… to the farmer and his family that we owe 
the prosperity and permanence of the countryside,” the pavilion stressed, illustrating the 
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importance of agriculturalists in maintaining and resupplying the nation’s food stores.273 This 
recognition produced an archetype of the farmer that, like that of the craftsman, idealized life in 
the countryside while removing mention of the unattractive aspects of this kind of labor. It 
affirmed, 
Throughout the whole story of Britain’s countryside, one feature remains constant: the 
kind of man who has brought it about. It is true that his appearance has changed… Now, 
he has become a technician putting to everyday use the results of five hundred years of 
development and of science. He can drive a tractor, and mend and maintain any of his 
mechanical aids; but still, his feet are firmly on the ground — the ground from which his 
livelihood and our prosperity have always come, and whose good health it is in his pride 
to maintain.274 
 
Although the pavilion refrained from featuring the farmer as an “old-style yokel” or “rough, 
uncultured being in corduroys, uncouth in accent and in manner,” it constructed the modern 
farmer as a flawless and docile contributor to the egalitarian nation.275 The modern farmer was 
happy to offer his labor to support New Britain in the altruistic footsteps of his ancestors. In 
recounting the extent to which the nation appreciated the labor of the farmer, the exhibition 
painted a rosy account of social cohesion in the postwar era. 
 The pavilion that followed focused on the harvesting of “Minerals of the Island.” 
Halfway through the upstream circuit, the South Bank celebrated the invaluable contributions of 
miners to British industrialization. After having “saluted the men who cultivate the surface of our 
land,” the circuit introduced “the riches that lie within our earth, the men who dig those riches 
out, and the men who use this long quiescent wealth as new material for our industry.”276 
Displays presented the immeasurable uses of coal and steel, along with the role of the miner in 
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collecting iron-ore. They even accented the miners’ noble endurance for working in unideal 
conditions. Indeed, the pavilion admitted that “no machine can alter the ancient facts that seams 
are often only waist high, and the roof may not allow an average man to stand upright. No words 
can convey exactly the feeling of the inside of a mine.”277 A miner was thus an exceptional asset 
to the nation, as few had the facilities to bear such a harsh work environment. For these 
sacrifices, Britons were grateful. To gain further insight into the miners’ experience, the pavilion 
even encouraged visitors to enter a reconstructed mineshaft, where they admired the work of the 
miner and saw “some of his newer tools.”278 The Festival encouraged visitors to sympathize with 
their munificent compatriots. 
 Factory workers were of equal importance to industrial operation. They enabled industry 
to function, what the “Power and Production” pavilion considered the “lifeline” of the nation, 
and, as a result, buttressed recovery after the war.279 The pavilion asserted that “no amount of 
effort given to research, testing and management, however, can replace the operatives and the 
craftsmen at the hub of the whole industrial machine.”280 Just like the other professions, the 
factory worker represented an indispensable part of British industry and “the machine age,” as 
not everyone could perform their responsibilities.281 Looking at the steelworker, for instance, the 
pavilion emphasized their impressive ability to manipulate hot metal. “Fireworks and fumes” 
composed the atmosphere inside the steelworks, where “molten metal is maneuvered like melted 
butter with what looks like little effort from these men of skill.”282 In general, moreover, factory 
workers inherited and built upon a tradition in which their “job…is the result of knowledge and 
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experience directed upon him from a number of sources.”283 While featuring the technicalities 
behind skilled factory labor, “Power and Production” placed these workers in the British 
industrial enterprise and related their efforts to the prosperity of the nation as a whole. And like 
the former pavilion, visitors had the opportunity to experience life as a factory worker, as “the 
public cafeteria in this building will be dressed as a workers’ canteen, so that the equipment of 
this will also rank as an exhibit.”284 Once again, the South Bank Exhibition promoted integration 
between workers and the public. 
 Shipworkers and sailors, finally, received recognition for their contributions to the nation, 
as they supported transatlantic commerce and served as the connecting threads that entwined the 
Commonwealth. The “Sea and Ships” pavilion recalled, “Without the enterprise of our ship 
owners and their associates in the vast business of operating shipping lines, the growth of the 
British Commonwealth would have followed very different trends. Without a mercantile marine 
such as we have now, we people of Britain and our industries would starve.”285 These workers, 
then, were essential to industrial prosperity, the lifeline of New Britain. All Britons understood 
this, the pavilion informed. They preserved the tradition of British naval and mercantile power, 
and ensured its continuity into the present, working in the image of “our ancestors [who] came 
by sea and found natural havens here for their craft. We still live on the sea and by it, using this 
same coastline as the childbed of our inheritance — the building of ships for the world and for 
ourselves.”286 Acting in this tradition, shipworkers and sailors were content to carry out the 
national interest to the benefit of all citizens.  
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 Overall, the upstream circuit at the South Bank Exhibition attempted to appease 
discontent by paying homage to the workers who had fueled the reconstruction process, 
especially in British industry and in manufacturing. Because the South Bank highlighted 
reconstruction’s successes, it needed to acknowledge the efforts of the ordinary Britons who 
continued, so the story goes, to work and make sacrifices for the benefit of all citizens. An 
egalitarian work ethic had, apparently, continued from the war into reconstruction. In 
emphasizing this collective mentality, the upstream circuit produced a harmonious image of the 
postwar nation that lacked class tensions, and educated visitors on the key roles that workers 
undertook to make New Britain tick – a mechanism that, under austerity, had sometimes needed 
rewinding.   
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CONCLUSION 
The 1951 Festival of Britain was not only a “tonic for the nation,” a restorative 
celebration given to Britons for their resilience during the war, but a confirmation of the 
successes of reconstruction in the immediate postwar period. On the South Bank, the Festival 
Council constructed pavilions that stressed the egalitarian benefits made possible through 
socialist legislation, benefits that some Britons had dreamed of in the early war years. Planning 
for the postwar era had begun as early as 1941, where formal reconstruction proposals boosted 
public morale and incentivized civilians to voice their own hopes and expectations for an 
envisioned New Britain. While some of these ideals became increasingly unachievable and 
utopian, the South Bank Exhibition packaged reconstruction as having established a better, 
egalitarian world based on socialist democratic principles. At the Festival, New Britain remained 
a shiny utopia and not an applied ideal.  
 Paradise, indeed, was lost. Despite substantial progress made through socialist legislation, 
such as with the nationalization of core industries and the creation of the welfare state, change 
did not reach and then satisfy some working-class Britons quickly enough. Strikes remained 
telling signals of discontent with continued austerity measures, where the October 1945 Dockers’ 
Strike presented an emerging, postwar pessimism that deflated wartime hopes for the better, 
egalitarian future. Marked by schismatic class tensions and refusals to recognize the humanity of 
the dockers themselves, the strike offered a precarious inauguration to the postwar reconstruction 
programme that sought to establish a philanthropic, social congruity. Nearly one year later, the 
V&A’s Britain Can Make It exhibition attempted to present this very image. Even if a class 
system continued to exist, the exhibition promoted a socioeconomic harmony that had overcome 
timeworn prejudices and inequitable discrepancies in standards of living. Now, New Britain 
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prompted the idea that all classes could enjoy and consume modernity. While most visitors did 
express satisfaction with the egalitarian world on offer, the upcoming winter brought a 
paralyzing fuel shortage that welcomed Britons into a period of severe economic crises. Labor 
scarcity in all major industries evidenced an arduous, unforgiving, and incremental 
reconstruction process. An acute deficiency in exports, together with strict rations, monotonous 
diets, and instability and violence in the Commonwealth showed that the nation had little 
momentum to once again secure its status as a world power. The postwar era thus underlined the 
inability of planning to ensure the full implementation of the ideals and expectations assembled 
during the war. During the late 1940s and into 1950, the future remained ambiguous and 
uncertain, regardless of the promising and structured proposals of the early war years. 
 Discontent reinforced the need for the Festival of Britain in 1951, a celebration not just of 
British culture, but of industrial revival. It confirmed recovery, heralded the people’s 
perseverance in face of demanding conditions, and showcased the egalitarian Britain that 
postwar reconstruction had supposedly achieved. At the South Bank Exhibition, the upstream 
circuit identified those who had helped to bring about the better nation as well, and attempted to 
appease the workers who had felt the weights of wartime and postwar austerity the most. 
Providing visitors with opportunities to learn more about and even experience the everyday lives 
of craftsmen, farmers, miners, factory workers, and shipworkers, the Festival encouraged 
integration and understanding among Britons. While not suggesting that the nation had reached a 
new, unparalleled dawn of classlessness, the South Bank nevertheless gave the impression that 
reconstruction had transformed Britain into the egalitarian society envisioned and requested by 
the people during the Second World War. In New Britain, everyone was content to work for the 
benefit and welfare of the other. In New Britain, the collective war effort of the past had 
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transformed into a collective effort to better endow the future. According to the Festival, myth 
had become reality.  
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